Do you Think we have Free Will

[Nakosis]

that compatibilists tend to focus on how to define the expression "free will" within the framework of determinism. Incompatibilists say that it can't be done.

That's true. Determinism defines free will as something that couldn't possible exist. Then they say, "Well look, it doesn't exist". It is basically nonsense. Define something that can't exist and then argue its non-existence.

Compatibilists, no mater how they want to approach it, start with the nonsense of determinism and try to say free will still exists when determinism has already defined it out of existence.

Libertarian free will relies on metaphysics for which there is no evidence of and one can make up whatever rules for it they want, as long as it smells logical since it could never be verified anyway.

Incompatibilists are usually indetermists, the idea of the uncaused cause or the afore mentioned libertarian concept.

Then there is the rare appeal to randomness however that was also ruled out in the OP,

Unfortunately the OP defined free will within the genre of determinism so there is really no further argument that could be made except to say, you have defined something which can't exist and have asked people to vote on whether it exists or not.

 

[shunyadragon]

First of all, you are hanging a lot on a web page of course material from a CUNY Queens College philosophy course. Do you have firsthand experience with this course or the professor teaching it? I think that the short list of exclusions you found in that web page are open to varying interpretation and debate, and I'm not at all clear on how he or she would develop those topics. A better source for the term would be the entry for Compatibilism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which enumerates several different types of compatibilism and arguments against compatibilism by incompatibilists who criticize those types. I believe that the material there fully supports what I have been saying above--that compatibilists tend to focus on how to define the expression "free will" within the framework of determinism. Incompatibilists say that it can't be done.

No hanging hats, yes I have a background in course work on the subject,

I am willing to dialogue on the concept of "Potential Limited Free Will, but first we have to get an understanding of what Compatibilism is,. The concept of Potential Limited Free Will is NOT Compatibilism. The definition I provided is accurate. I have no problem providing other sources with the same definition of Compatibilism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a rather long wordy discussion of everything, but it does give the bottom line of what Compatibilian is. Some of what I read Compatibilism tries define a "Soft Determinism' to justify it. but in reality it only makes an awkward failed attempt at compatibility with actual determinism.

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

plato.stanford.edu

Consider the following incompatibilist objection to the classical compatibilist account of free will:

If determinism is true, and if at any given time, an unimpeded agent is completely determined to have the wants that she does have, and if those wants causally determine her actions, then, even though she does do what she wants to do, she cannot ever do otherwise. She satisfies the classical compatibilist conditions for free will. But free will requires the ability to do otherwise, and determinism is incompatible with this. Hence, the classical compatibilist account of free will is inadequate. Determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility because determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise.

The classical compatibilist account of freedom set out thus far can be thought of as accounting for one-way freedom, which fixes only on what a person does do, not on what alternatives she had to what she did. The incompatibilist challenge at issue here is that such freedom, even if necessary, is insufficient in the absence of a further freedom to do other than as one does.

My main problem with "limited free will" is that I just don't know what that means, and searching for authoritative source material on the subject doesn't seem to do much to illuminate the concept. What I would like to see is a clear definition of the concept that shows it is distinct from conventional approaches to compatibilism and incompatibilism. What is the middle position here? I look forward to your explanation. From what I've read of your posts, they seem in line with my point that incompatibilists equivocate on whether the perceiver of an action has or does not have knowledge of the outcome of that action. Compatibilists frame free will in the context of not knowing the outcome, whereas they frame determinism in the context of knowing the outcome. Incompatibilists invariably jump between the two perspectives as it suits them.

We can discuss this further, but we have to get past the hump in your road The definition of Compatibilism is more specific than your foggy rendition.

 

[shunyadragon]

Let's start with the definition of determinism.The simple definition is a misleading good start

https://languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.


The first part is sort of not okay, but the second described what 'some' philosophers believe determinism determines there is no Free Will and cannot be responsible for their actions. There is a problem first that a definition should be use 'some' as a part of the definitin, Incomplete.

I define determinism as fundamentally all cause and effect outcomes in nature are determined by Natural Laws and the outcomes of the chain of cause and effect events within a range of outcomes limited by natural factors including choices of human will. The nature of the range of the outcomes is described by chaos theory as fractal. There is no randomness involved here, because of the predictability of the limits of the range of outcomes based on the number of factors. An example in nature is how weather prediction.

I propose that the outcomes of our choices are determined within a range of possible outcomes, based on the limiting factors of use being human as in nature in general as in nature. Yes, this range of choices is restricted, but not absolutely determined as described as having no Free Will. Many if not most of our choices may have likely only one determined choice, but some may have a restricted or limited range of possible outcomes. I consider this a potential, because most humans do not exercise the possibility of making a choice outside a given determined choice.

The following form a reference previously cited describes this as a restricted limit of possible outcomes of human choices.

What is “limited free will”?

I have heard that humans have a limited or constrained free will, especially when biological limitations are brought up. However, Merriam-Webster dictionary says: Limited 1a: confined within limits:

philosophy.stackexchange.com

Some of Sartrian points explaining why we are not capriciously free individuals. That partly answers on "restricted freedom". In what sense are we restricted and not unlimited in our choices?

• Even refusal to choose is the choice made, a choice with its consequencies, thus not to choose is impossible. There is always 2+ possibilities to choose among, but a man is not free not to choose.
• Situation is organized, not is released. It presents some possibilities while conceals other ones. I cannot choose among what I don't perceive. It also is organized in a form of outer-world instrumental requirements therefore demanding consistency from my actions I choose.
• Primeval Other is not an object but a "lateral gaze" for my consciousness (that is why it precedes "I" and makes solipsism impossible), so the consciousness cannot be free against it (like it always free against an object). Whenever I catalogue or judge myself, that is due to the Other in me. That is why my choice would be sincere, being done "in front of" the (implied) mankind.
• In addition to that I cannot get of the "gaze" of others, I am the only source of values for the world. To Sartre, conventional or real values do not exist. To claim that bread or life are a value per se, constantly and independently of concrete individuals using them, is a form of dishonesty called by him "the spirit of seriousness". If not thank to me, world would have no values. Therefore I cannot escape responsibility since it is me who is the value provider.
• A caprice would imply that a ready man already is, as a foundation of himself. In fact, any effective capriciousness amounts to insistence for what preexists (e.g. Ego with its demands). But this is wrong relative to human (consciousness), who cannot be founded anyhow before a choice and who only constitutes himself for the first time in his choice. Only a substance could show caprices, consciousness isn't a substance.
• Not only the choice isn't keeping my own way behind, it is also not following a guaranteed end ahead. Consciousness cannot tie itself reliably to its aim because the latter is a possibility that simply "might be", and reflection opens the nothing between me and the selected possibility. Thus, marked off his future (possibility) as strongly as off his past (preexisting ego), a man is too restless to be capricious.
• There in principle cannot be drawn the border between what is facticity in a given situation and what is my constitution in it. It appears that I'm completely thrown into the objective situation and am totally free in it. Here is no contradiction: both is true. And consequently, from the very start I see only my free project (choice) in the situation ("meet nothing except myself"), a project which is possible exceptionally in this situation and in no other one. In other words, a man is engaged from the beginning and he deserves everything having happened with him, so that there is no alibi and any given was past possibility and is current opportunity for... And only thanks to factual obstacles/misfortunes a freedom appeares as realizable.
• Will is a reflective movement, but we choose pre-reflectively (which isn't "unconsiously"). Will only signals that the choice (which is but free spontaneous) has been just made. Situation understanding comes with the choice made and earlier than there comes situation knowing/judgement, but will operates on the latter. Thus, there is no need for term free will, freedom is enough.

More to follow from this and other references concerning the nature of "Limited Free Will." One point is the concept of 'Limited Free Will od Freedom" does not provide an absolute limit on the limit of freedom of human choices. It does conclude that the extremes of Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism "No Free Will" which includes Compatibilism are not well supported in their extreme conclusions.

 

[shunyadragon]

The question of "Moral Responsibility" is often used as a factor in whether Hard Determinism "No Free Will" and Libertarian Free Will is true.

I do not consider the issue of "Moral Responsibility" an issue, because regardless of whether there is "Free Will" or not Moral Responsibility is an unavoidable property of the necessity of human culture ever since humans have been human and also apparent in primitive forms in primates as necessary for the survival of the species. The human species could nor survive without "Moral Responsibility."

As part of the argument against Libertarian Free Will is many factors of Moral Responsibility and simply the ability of some humans to make decisions is Limited by factors such as mental illness and addictions, Recent evolution in Law and considerations Moral Responsibility have been taken into account in the development and enforcement of Laws.

The question of Moral Responsibility is basically a non-issue concerning the existence or the degree of the reality of Free Will.

 

[shunyadragon]

That's true. Determinism defines free will as something that couldn't possible exist. Then they say, "Well look, it doesn't exist". It is basically nonsense. Define something that can't exist and then argue its non-existence.

Compatibilists, no mater how they want to approach it, start with the nonsense of determinism and try to say free will still exists when determinism has already defined it out of existence.

Libertarian free will relies on metaphysics for which there is no evidence of and one can make up whatever rules for it they want, as long as it smells logical since it could never be verified anyway.

Incompatibilists are usually indetermists, the idea of the uncaused cause or the afore mentioned libertarian concept.

Then there is the rare appeal to randomness however that was also ruled out in the OP,

Unfortunately the OP defined free will within the genre of determinism so there is really no further argument that could be made except to say, you have defined something which can't exist and have asked people to vote on whether it exists or not.

Yes, Libertarian Free Will is out of the realm of possibility, because it has so many problems including a subjective Theological argument based on an agenda not evidence, but the Extreme of Hard Determinism is not without problems.

Compatibilism is untenable, because it has no clear differentiation from Hard Determinism, it remains deterministic with no Free Will. The concept of "Soft Determinism is an allusion.

 

[shunyadragon]

That's true. Determinism defines free will as something that couldn't possible exist. Then they say, "Well look, it doesn't exist". It is basically nonsense. Define something that can't exist and then argue its non-existence.

Compatibilists, no mater how they want to approach it, start with the nonsense of determinism and try to say free will still exists when determinism has already defined it out of existence.

Libertarian free will relies on metaphysics for which there is no evidence of and one can make up whatever rules for it they want, as long as it smells logical since it could never be verified anyway.

Incompatibilists are usually indetermists, the idea of the uncaused cause or the afore mentioned libertarian concept.

Then there is the rare appeal to randomness however that was also ruled out in the OP,

Unfortunately the OP defined free will within the genre of determinism so there is really no further argument that could be made except to say, you have defined something which can't exist and have asked people to vote on whether it exists or not.

Further comments:

Randomness does not apply to our decision making process, because every decision we make has a cause. Also, all the cause and effect outcomes in nature occur within a range of possible outcomes with a natural cause, therefore nothing is random.

I do not believe determinism negates the possibility of limited "Free Will" unless you consider nature rigidly deterministic without a range of possible outcomes of cause and effect events.

 

[Copernicus]

Compatibilists, no mater how they want to approach it, start with the nonsense of determinism and try to say free will still exists when determinism has already defined it out of existence.

That's not quite accurate. Compatibilists usually attack the way in which incompatibilists define free will. They don't simply accept the definitions that incompatibilists come up with. However, they do define it within the framework of determinism. Bear in mind that "determinism" doesn't define the concept, people do. So we should be careful not to confuse "determinist" with "incompatibilist". Compatibilists are determinists. Incompatibilists may or may not be.

 

[Copernicus]

No hanging hats, yes I have a background in course work on the subject,

OK, so I conclude that you don't have coursework in the particular course whose materials you cited. That's all I had to go on.

I am willing to dialogue on the concept of "Potential Limited Free Will, but first we have to get an understanding of what Compatibilism is,. The concept of Potential Limited Free Will is NOT Compatibilism. The definition I provided is accurate. I have no problem providing other sources with the same definition of Compatibilism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a rather long wordy discussion of everything, but it does give the bottom line of what Compatibilian is. Some of what I read Compatibilism tries define a "Soft Determinism' to justify it. but in reality it only makes an awkward failed attempt at compatibility with actual determinism.

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

plato.stanford.edu

Consider the following incompatibilist objection to the classical compatibilist account of free will:

If determinism is true, and if at any given time, an unimpeded agent is completely determined to have the wants that she does have, and if those wants causally determine her actions, then, even though she does do what she wants to do, she cannot ever do otherwise. She satisfies the classical compatibilist conditions for free will. But free will requires the ability to do otherwise, and determinism is incompatible with this. Hence, the classical compatibilist account of free will is inadequate. Determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility because determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise.

The classical compatibilist account of freedom set out thus far can be thought of as accounting for one-way freedom, which fixes only on what a person does do, not on what alternatives she had to what she did. The incompatibilist challenge at issue here is that such freedom, even if necessary, is insufficient in the absence of a further freedom to do other than as one does.

We can discuss this further, but we have to get past the hump in your road The definition of Compatibilism is more specific than your foggy rendition.

Continuing with your concluding metaphor, I would say that racing over that speed bump has damaged the undercarriage of your argument. First of all, you pulled that passage from section 2.2, which is "The Classical Compatibilist Conditional Analysis", not the only description of compatibilism that philosophers hold on the subject. You refer to my "foggy rendition" of compatibilism as not specific enough because you apparently wish to constrain it to that classical definition, even though it isn't the only one discussed in that article. I detect the hint of a No True Scotsman argument here. We can start dueling over definitions, but I would rather not get distracted with a terminological dispute that doesn't really focus on substantive issues. I think we both have a basic understanding of determinism, incompatibilism, and compatibilism.

My question was how to define "Limited Free Will". I'll respond to your later post on that subject next...

 

[Copernicus]

Let's start with the definition of determinism.The simple definition is a misleading good start

https://languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.


The first part is sort of not okay, but the second described what 'some' philosophers believe determinism determines there is no Free Will and cannot be responsible for their actions. There is a problem first that a definition should be use 'some' as a part of the definitin, Incomplete.

I define determinism as fundamentally all cause and effect outcomes in nature are determined by Natural Laws and the outcomes of the chain of cause and effect events within a range of outcomes limited by natural factors including choices of human will. The nature of the range of the outcomes is described by chaos theory as fractal. There is no randomness involved here, because of the predictability of the limits of the range of outcomes based on the number of factors. An example in nature is how weather prediction.

I don't have a huge problem with what you say above, although I consider the references to chaos theory and "fractal" range of outcomes to be a bit too postmodernist for my tastes. Chaos theory is about predictability within chaotic deterministic systems. It doesn't strike me as clarifying a point that needs to be clarified.

I propose that the outcomes of our choices are determined within a range of possible outcomes, based on the limiting factors of use being human as in nature in general as in nature. Yes, this range of choices is restricted, but not absolutely determined as described as having no Free Will. Many if not most of our choices may have likely only one determined choice, but some may have a restricted or limited range of possible outcomes. I consider this a potential, because most humans do not exercise the possibility of making a choice outside a given determined choice.

Sorry, but I just don't understand how to interpret the above passage. It doesn't seem to be saying much other than that we have a range of choices to choose from, but it doesn't give any specific analysis of an act of "free will".

The following form a reference previously cited describes this as a restricted limit of possible outcomes of human choices.

What is “limited free will”?

I have heard that humans have a limited or constrained free will, especially when biological limitations are brought up. However, Merriam-Webster dictionary says: Limited 1a: confined within limits:

philosophy.stackexchange.com

OK, but the moderators closed that thread with the comment:

While this question may be related to philosophy or occur in a philosophical context, the question itself doesn't seem to be about philosophy, and is therefore not a good fit for our site.​

I suspect that, like me, they didn't find it a very coherent topic for discussion on their site. So I do think you need a better source to reference for your definition of limited free will.

Some of Sartrian points explaining why we are not capriciously free individuals. That partly answers on "restricted freedom". In what sense are we restricted and not unlimited in our choices?

• Even refusal to choose is the choice made, a choice with its consequencies, thus not to choose is impossible. There is always 2+ possibilities to choose among, but a man is not free not to choose.
• Situation is organized, not is released. It presents some possibilities while conceals other ones. I cannot choose among what I don't perceive. It also is organized in a form of outer-world instrumental requirements therefore demanding consistency from my actions I choose.
• Primeval Other is not an object but a "lateral gaze" for my consciousness (that is why it precedes "I" and makes solipsism impossible), so the consciousness cannot be free against it (like it always free against an object). Whenever I catalogue or judge myself, that is due to the Other in me. That is why my choice would be sincere, being done "in front of" the (implied) mankind.
• In addition to that I cannot get of the "gaze" of others, I am the only source of values for the world. To Sartre, conventional or real values do not exist. To claim that bread or life are a value per se, constantly and independently of concrete individuals using them, is a form of dishonesty called by him "the spirit of seriousness". If not thank to me, world would have no values. Therefore I cannot escape responsibility since it is me who is the value provider.
• A caprice would imply that a ready man already is, as a foundation of himself. In fact, any effective capriciousness amounts to insistence for what preexists (e.g. Ego with its demands). But this is wrong relative to human (consciousness), who cannot be founded anyhow before a choice and who only constitutes himself for the first time in his choice. Only a substance could show caprices, consciousness isn't a substance.
• Not only the choice isn't keeping my own way behind, it is also not following a guaranteed end ahead. Consciousness cannot tie itself reliably to its aim because the latter is a possibility that simply "might be", and reflection opens the nothing between me and the selected possibility. Thus, marked off his future (possibility) as strongly as off his past (preexisting ego), a man is too restless to be capricious.
• There in principle cannot be drawn the border between what is facticity in a given situation and what is my constitution in it. It appears that I'm completely thrown into the objective situation and am totally free in it. Here is no contradiction: both is true. And consequently, from the very start I see only my free project (choice) in the situation ("meet nothing except myself"), a project which is possible exceptionally in this situation and in no other one. In other words, a man is engaged from the beginning and he deserves everything having happened with him, so that there is no alibi and any given was past possibility and is current opportunity for... And only thanks to factual obstacles/misfortunes a freedom appeares as realizable.
• Will is a reflective movement, but we choose pre-reflectively (which isn't "unconsiously"). Will only signals that the choice (which is but free spontaneous) has been just made. Situation understanding comes with the choice made and earlier than there comes situation knowing/judgement, but will operates on the latter. Thus, there is no need for term free will, freedom is enough.

That's a wall of text to unpack, and I won't try to do that here. I'll just point out that definitions are concise rather than lengthy bulleted lists of talking points. This list contains lots of questionable assumptions.

More to follow from this and other references concerning the nature of "Limited Free Will." One point is the concept of 'Limited Free Will od Freedom" does not provide an absolute limit on the limit of freedom of human choices. It does conclude that the extremes of Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism "No Free Will" which includes Compatibilism are not well supported in their extreme conclusions.

Well, other references would be useful, since that one is five years old and on a deprecated thread. Telling us what "Limited Free Will" is not does not help us to understand what it is. How are the limits determined? In what sense is it limited?

 

[shunyadragon]

That's not quite accurate. Compatibilists usually attack the way in which incompatibilists define free will. They don't simply accept the definitions that incompatibilists come up with. However, they do define it within the framework of determinism. Bear in mind that "determinism" doesn't define the concept, people do. So we should be careful not to confuse "determinist" with "incompatibilist". Compatibilists are determinists. Incompatibilists may or may not be.

You are arguing semantics which is meaningless and circular and not responding to substance of the posts.

Compatibilism is as defined by my references..

 

[Copernicus]

You are arguing semantics which is meaningless and circular and not responding to substance of the posts.

Compatibilism is as defined by my references..

Actually, I was trying to avoid a semantic argument, but you keep going to your favorite definitions of compatibilism, which are somehow necessary before you will say in plain words what "limited free will" is. Every compatibilist takes the position that free will can be defined within a framework of determinism, but not every compatibilist agrees on how exactly to define free will. So it appears that your concept of "limited free will" may, in fact, just be another such exercise in refining the concept of free will in a way that makes it compatible with determinism. Until I can get some clarification from you on what your concept of "limited free will" means in plain English, we can't make any progress. I note that you didn't even try to answer my two questions:

1) In what sense is free will limited?
2) How are the limits of free will determined?

 

[Nakosis]

That's not quite accurate. Compatibilists usually attack the way in which incompatibilists define free will. They don't simply accept the definitions that incompatibilists come up with. However, they do define it within the framework of determinism. Bear in mind that "determinism" doesn't define the concept, people do. So we should be careful not to confuse "determinist" with "incompatibilist". Compatibilists are determinists. Incompatibilists may or may not be.

I suppose I am in this boat, sorta.
Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will.

My view is that the definition of free will used by determinists provides nothing useful. It basically says free will doesn't exist, so there is no discussion to be had.

However there exists free will. My view is that free will is relative to the number of options one has available to them. For example if a person is incarcerated, they certainly have less free will than the person who is not. That definition, imo, does have value. We can desire greater free will than we currently have. So that concept of free will is something. Something we can seek to obtain.

Therefore to define free will as something that can't exist when it obviously does is not useful for a discussion.

Our moral systems and penal system work with this understanding. Greater free will is something that is desirable. Something that restricts your free will is not.

 

[shunyadragon]

I don't have a huge problem with what you say above, although I consider the references to chaos theory and "fractal" range of outcomes to be a bit too postmodernist for my tastes. Chaos theory is about predictability within chaotic deterministic systems. It doesn't strike me as clarifying a point that needs to be clarified.

Chaos Theory as an explanation in terms of the nature of possible ranges of cause and effect outcomes depending on the variables involved is now at the foundation of all of the sciences. As humans we are not above nature, but very much a part of it. Humans do have a range of possible outcomes for our decision making process. The problem is how limited are our choices based on the external and internal causes of limitations,

It doesn't seem to be saying much other than that we have a range of choices to choose from, but it doesn't give any specific analysis of an act of "free will".

Sorry, but you have strong bias here,the passage is just fine as it is stated.

OK, but the moderators closed that thread with the comment:

The comment remains valid.

Well, other references would be useful, since that one is five years old and on a deprecated thread. Telling us what "Limited Free Will" is not does not help us to understand what it is. How are the limits determined? In what sense is it limited?​

Given your supposed background you should not even have to ask these questions. There are many references that detail the research on limitations of Free Will.

Free Will is limited by by many external and internal factors. The question is more on the degree of limitation. Brief summary.There extensive references that give details.

Internal and External Constraints on Free Will Essay | Bartleby

Free Essay: Internal and External Constraints on Free Will The concept of free will in and of itself is a complex issue with many factors weighing heavily...

www.bartleby.com

"The concept of free will in and of itself is a complex issue with many factors weighing heavily upon it. To say that one is absolutely free in making decisions is shortsighted and naive. For example, environmental, social, biological, and even evolutionary factors greatly effect the way in which we go about choosing a viable option. To be able to make a completely free decision, one would have to live in a vacuum devoid of all external influences. However, one would still have to consider the internal constraints acting upon our will to choose."

The following article is very long and goes into considerable detail concerning research into the nature of human will and the role of determinism in the process.

Internal and External Constraints on Free Will Essay | Bartleby

Free Essay: Internal and External Constraints on Free Will The concept of free will in and of itself is a complex issue with many factors weighing heavily...

www.bartleby.com

Conclusions

Free will is an elusive but crucial concept. For many years we have known that the functioning of our brain has to do not only with the belief that we have free will but also with the existence of free will itself. Evidence of the unconscious start of movement, highlighted by the RP signal, has led to believe that we had reached an experimental proof of the non-existence of free will—which many already claimed at a theoretical level based on the argument of the incompatibility between determinism and freedom. Along with other evidence provided by experimental psychology, the branch of studies inaugurated by Libet has contributed to seeing free will as an illusion: this view seemed to be reliably supported by science, and in particular by neuroscience. Recent studies, however, seem to question this paradigm, which sees the initiation and conscious control of the action as the first requirement of free will, allegedly proving that there are no such things.

. . .

According to Craver (2007), a mechanistic explanation is able to lead to an inter-field integration. There are two relevant aspects to this approach. The functional knowledge that can be drawn from psychological research is a tool to identify neural mechanisms; the knowledge of the brain structure can guide the construction of far more sophisticated psychological models (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). The index of free will that I am proposing (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015)—despite surely needing further refinement—might be useful to explore the brain mechanisms that underlie what appears in behavior as “free will”, which no longer seems to be an illusion, not even for neuroscientific research.

 

[Copernicus]

Chaos Theory as an explanation in terms of the nature of possible ranges of cause and effect outcomes depending on the variables involved is now at the foundation of all of the sciences. As humans we are not above nature, but very much a part of it. Humans do have a range of possible outcomes for our decision making process. The problem is how limited are our choices based on the external and internal causes of limitations,

Sorry, but you have strong bias here,the passage is just fine as it is stated.


The comment remains valid.

Given your supposed background you should not even have to ask these questions. There are many references that detail the research on limitations of Free Will.

Free Will is limited by by many external and internal factors. The question is more on the degree of limitation. Brief summary.There extensive references that give details.

Internal and External Constraints on Free Will Essay | Bartleby

Free Essay: Internal and External Constraints on Free Will The concept of free will in and of itself is a complex issue with many factors weighing heavily...

www.bartleby.com

"The concept of free will in and of itself is a complex issue with many factors weighing heavily upon it. To say that one is absolutely free in making decisions is shortsighted and naive. For example, environmental, social, biological, and even evolutionary factors greatly effect the way in which we go about choosing a viable option. To be able to make a completely free decision, one would have to live in a vacuum devoid of all external influences. However, one would still have to consider the internal constraints acting upon our will to choose."

The following article is very long and goes into considerable detail concerning research into the nature of human will and the role of determinism in the process.

Internal and External Constraints on Free Will Essay | Bartleby

Free Essay: Internal and External Constraints on Free Will The concept of free will in and of itself is a complex issue with many factors weighing heavily...

www.bartleby.com

Conclusions

Free will is an elusive but crucial concept. For many years we have known that the functioning of our brain has to do not only with the belief that we have free will but also with the existence of free will itself. Evidence of the unconscious start of movement, highlighted by the RP signal, has led to believe that we had reached an experimental proof of the non-existence of free will—which many already claimed at a theoretical level based on the argument of the incompatibility between determinism and freedom. Along with other evidence provided by experimental psychology, the branch of studies inaugurated by Libet has contributed to seeing free will as an illusion: this view seemed to be reliably supported by science, and in particular by neuroscience. Recent studies, however, seem to question this paradigm, which sees the initiation and conscious control of the action as the first requirement of free will, allegedly proving that there are no such things.

. . .

According to Craver (2007), a mechanistic explanation is able to lead to an inter-field integration. There are two relevant aspects to this approach. The functional knowledge that can be drawn from psychological research is a tool to identify neural mechanisms; the knowledge of the brain structure can guide the construction of far more sophisticated psychological models (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). The index of free will that I am proposing (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015)—despite surely needing further refinement—might be useful to explore the brain mechanisms that underlie what appears in behavior as “free will”, which no longer seems to be an illusion, not even for neuroscientific research.

Thanks for the discussion, Shunya. I do not feel that I have had any answers to my questions or my request for a plain language explanation of what "limited free will" means in the context of the compatibilist/incompatibilist controversy that I am familiar with in the literature. I know about Libet, Lavazza, Inglese, etc., but that does not actually address my questions to my satisfaction, and I no longer believe I will get those answers. So I think it's best we leave it at your well-meant attempts to set me straight. I think we agree on a lot of issues, but this one isn't going anywhere for me.

 

[shunyadragon]

Actually, I was trying to avoid a semantic argument, but you keep going to your favorite definitions of compatibilism, which are somehow necessary before you will say in plain words what "limited free will" is.

You are apparently not trying to avoid a semantics argument.

Every compatibilist takes the position that free will can be defined within a framework of determinism, but not every compatibilist agrees on how exactly to define free will. So it appears that your concept of "limited free will" may, in fact, just be another such exercise in refining the concept of free will in a way that makes it compatible with determinism. Until I can get some clarification from you on what your concept of "limited free will" means in plain English, we can't make any progress. I note that you didn't even try to answer my two questions:

The issue is NOT compatibilism. The concept Limited Free Will is Not Compatibilism

1) In what sense is free will limited?
2) How are the limits of free will determined?

Questions answered inpost #493. In fact this post provides a reference that details the history of the recent history of the research from Libet research where the dominant view of this and other early research support Determinism up to the near present where determinism seriously questions determinism, and allows for limited Free Will.

There is one more factor that limits free will and that is the prior chain of cause and effect choices or decisions.

 

[shunyadragon]

Thanks for the discussion, Shunya. I do not feel that I have had any answers to my questions or my request for a plain language explanation of what "limited free will" means in the context of the compatibilist/incompatibilist controversy that I am familiar with in the literature. I know about Libet, Lavazza, Inglese, etc., but that does not actually address my questions to my satisfaction, and I no longer believe I will get those answers. So I think it's best we leave it at your well-meant attempts to set me straight. I think we agree on a lot of issues, but this one isn't going anywhere for me.

You have failed to acknowledge nor respond to post $493 where your questions were answered. I seriously question your familiarity with the literature, because of your foggy knowledge of Compatibilism. You have failed to articulate your view and provide any references, of course in plain English, to support your view whatever that is,

With your claim of familiarity with the literature you should be fully able to answer the questions and respond coherently here, but you have failed to do so.

All my answers were in plain English, and with referenced sources and definitions and you played Duck, Bob and Weasel amd failed to acknowledge the references.

 

[shunyadragon]

I suppose I am in this boat, sorta.
Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will.

My view is that the definition of free will used by determinists provides nothing useful. It basically says free will doesn't exist, so there is no discussion to be had.

It is more not a viable option like Libertarian Free Will or Compatibilism based on the evidence.

However there exists free will. My view is that free will is relative to the number of options one has available to them. For example if a person is incarcerated, they certainly have less free will than the person who is not. That definition, imo, does have value. We can desire greater free will than we currently have. So that concept of free will is something. Something we can seek to obtain.

I believe the degree of Free Will is more inherent in the nature of being human,a nd not specific social considerations like incarceration. It is true that different cultures and religions are different in the degree of the factors they represent constraints or limits on Free Will, but all cultures and religions do represent factors that limit Free Will.

Therefore to define free will as something that can't exist when it obviously does is not useful for a discussion.

Agree sort of. It is useful as far as a discussion to consider the different options. Yes, those that believe in Determinism only consider there to be no Free Will likely supporting the research like that if Libit. I believe Libertarian Free Will is not a real option. There for we need to explore a middle ground of limited Free Will. Compatibilism is just another version of determinism.

I did provide a good comprehensive reference in post #493 that concluded that neither Libertarian Free Will nor extreme Determinism are not viable.

Our moral systems and penal system work with this understanding. Greater free will is something that is desirable. Something that restricts your free will is not.

As described previously or Moral systems are basically a necessary part of human social existence regardless of whether humans have Free Will or not. Moral Responsibility is a product of our evolution for humans to survive as intelligent omnivores with social hierarchy of families and tribes. Our primate ancestors and relatives have similar, but more primitive social structure and Moral Responsibility required for their survival.

 

[Polymath257]

* In this context Free Will is defined as the ability to make choices that are not fully determined by past events nor fully random

Do those past events include my thoughts and actions previously? Do they include all the information I have available half a second before the decision is made?

What does it mean to be fully determined in a universe that is probabilistic?

I know this is a hard question and that nobody claims to have 100% certanity..... but in your opinion what is more likely to be true?... do you think humans have the aility to make choices ?

I ultimately think the question is ill defined.

For free will to be possible, it needs to be the case that there are 'possible futures' that differ. It also needs to be the case that something *I* do determines which possible future becomes reality.

I am not fully comfortable saying that the notion of more than one 'possible future' is even coherent, especially at a macroscopic level. It certainly contradicts the notion of determinism, which has only one possible future at each point. How quantum indeterminacy enters into this is yet another question (I would bet not significantly, but who knows?).

So even the first step is in doubt: can there be more than one possible future?

Next, there is the question of whether it is something *I* do that determines that 'possible future'. This causes a host of issues: what, precisely, is meant by the 'I' in that sentence? If 'I' am the result of my brain states, it is saying that something that happens in my brain determines which of multiple possible futures actually becomes the case. That becomes a problem in physics as much as anything else. And it is clear that conscious choices do NOT determine the course of quantum events, so that indeterminacy seems to not affect 'free will'.

But if 'I' am not the result of my brain state, then what am 'I'? Why does the brain seem to be so involved with all my thoughts, emotions, planning, etc? And, say, suppose my brain state was that of contemplating a certain choice, how is that different than *me* contemplating that choice? Can the two be different? Also, how does a choice 'I' make get put into effect? How does my (non-brain state) choice get translated into brain states and thereby physical change?

So, yes, we all have a 'feeling' that we have free will. But our feelings can be, and often are, incorrect. They can be useful illusions, but may not actually correspond to reality (determining that correspondence requires skepticism and a lot of testing).

I would also say that if we can't test whether we have free will (even in theory), then the question is literally meaningless. But it *does* look like we can test a lot and the answer seems to be that we have a lot less 'freedom to choose' than what our intuitions say. is any left? I don't know and I don't know how to test. And without testability, it seems to mean nothing at all.

 

[Polymath257]

What I *can* say is that our brains are a type of causal nexus whereby small differences in what happens in our brains can quickly lead to large differences in what we do and what happens in the larger world. This is the case even in a deterministic scenario. So, there are many situations where the brain state of an individual is a key aspect of being able to say what will happen next. And that seems to me to be a 'choice' in a conventional sense.

So the issue is whether that 'choice' is/was free. Is it determined by previous events? Well, I would sure *hope* so! I *want* my choices to be determined by my personality, my thoughts, my beliefs, my experiences, and my desires! Those are all 'previous events' that *should* be involved in any decision I make! To say otherwise would mean *I* am random and not really a coherent person through time.

 

[shunyadragon]

Do those past events include my thoughts and actions previously? Do they include all the information I have available half a second before the decision is made?

What does it mean to be fully determined in a universe that is probabilistic?

I ultimately think the question is ill defined.

For free will to be possible, it needs to be the case that there are 'possible futures' that differ. It also needs to be the case that something *I* do determines which possible future becomes reality.

I am not fully comfortable saying that the notion of more than one 'possible future' is even coherent, especially at a macroscopic level. It certainly contradicts the notion of determinism, which has only one possible future at each point. How quantum indeterminacy enters into this is yet another question (I would bet not significantly, but who knows?).

So even the first step is in doubt: can there be more than one possible future?

Next, there is the question of whether it is something *I* do that determines that 'possible future'. This causes a host of issues: what, precisely, is meant by the 'I' in that sentence? If 'I' am the result of my brain states, it is saying that something that happens in my brain determines which of multiple possible futures actually becomes the case. That becomes a problem in physics as much as anything else. And it is clear that conscious choices do NOT determine the course of quantum events, so that indeterminacy seems to not affect 'free will'.

But if 'I' am not the result of my brain state, then what am 'I'? Why does the brain seem to be so involved with all my thoughts, emotions, planning, etc? And, say, suppose my brain state was that of contemplating a certain choice, how is that different than *me* contemplating that choice? Can the two be different? Also, how does a choice 'I' make get put into effect? How does my (non-brain state) choice get translated into brain states and thereby physical change?

So, yes, we all have a 'feeling' that we have free will. But our feelings can be, and often are, incorrect. They can be useful illusions, but may not actually correspond to reality (determining that correspondence requires skepticism and a lot of testing).

I would also say that if we can't test whether we have free will (even in theory), then the question is literally meaningless. But it *does* look like we can test a lot and the answer seems to be that we have a lot less 'freedom to choose' than what our intuitions say. is any left? I don't know and I don't know how to test. And without testability, it seems to mean nothing at all.

I do believe there is legitimate research in recent history concerning the nature an limits of Free Will, and the degree of determinism in human choices, but the questions are not totally resolved. I do believe as described in the reference in post #493 that the extremes of Libertarian Free will, what is called 'Hard Determinism,' and Compatibilism are viable extremes that adequately describe the nature of human will.

I do not believe we can at present resolve the question of whether there are are alternate futures in terms of the potential present and future outcomes of the chain of cause and effect of human choices. Though considering the the fractal nature of the possible ranges of the outcomes in the natural cause and effect events their is a range of possible outcomes of future events withing the possible limits of Natural Laws. I do believe based on the fractal nature of outcomes in nature it is possible there are alternate future outcomes in the chains of human choices, but within limits.