Do you Think we have Free Will

[Nakosis]

Careful the chain of cause and effect outcomes in nature and in human decisions still follow the same limits of Natural Laws and natural processes, and influence the present and future decisions. All possible variations in our choices in the past. present and future still are subject to the natural limits and the nature of being evolved humans.

No, I do not believe our physical universe is absolutely mechanistically determined by Newtonian standards, but it remains determined within a range of possibilities with in the constraints if Natural Laws. Chaos Theory determines our physical existence in that all Maple leaves are different, but all Maple leaves look like Maple leaves, and all galaxies are different, but all look like galaxies. The number of possible variables involved in each case determines the possible range of outcomes.

The natural variation of the cause and effect outcomes in nature and our choices, though limited allows for a variation in outcomes. There are simple examples in everyday life such as when we dress in the morning. Many limiting factors in life, culture and such things as weather determine what we wear, but within these limits we may choose a limited range of clothing. Though in some cultures the limits are more constrained and people do wear the same thing every day with few variations such as in traditional Islam.

Our thoughts are both limiting in the chain of cause and effect of our thinking and the possible range of thoughts may be potentially causal, but again limited. I do believe that the nature of human thinking potentially looks for alternative solutions of problems, but still within a limited range of possible choices.

Perhaps we should look to expand our thinking. Providing more options.
At least, that is what I try to do by interacting with the thinking of others.

 

[shunyadragon]

Perhaps we should look to expand our thinking. Providing more options.
At least, that is what I try to do by interacting with the thinking of others.

I actually do that in many ways possible. The view of Potential Limited Free Will is toa degree open ended pending more information . The only specific view is the rejection of the extremes of Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism. Myj view at present. is thar our freedom of choice is very limited.

 

[Copernicus]

Regardless of who published it this is not a reference I care for.

We needn't argue over the Scientific American article, although I think you are objecting more to the background of the person who wrote the article rather than the merits of his scientific objections to a popular interpretation of Libet. You did not try to debunk anything in the content of that article. I used it only as an example to show that Libet isn't always seen as relevant to the free will debate. You haven't made clear how Libet is in any way incompatible with a compatibilist position. So I regard it as a red herring.

Itis not the accepted definition oc Compatibilism that is tricky and foggy. It is your view expressed in your posts and you do not accept the two sources I provided that define Compatibilism as not truly believing in any Free Will.

What you say here doesn't make any sense. You can't define compatibilism without believing that it is compatible with free will. Hence, the name. What compatibilists do is argue for a definition of free will that makes sense within a determinist frame of reference. If you don't get that, then you really don't understand the difference between compatibilism and hard determinism.

We are most definitely not communicating. As defined in two references. Yes, compatibilism is compatible with determinism, because the bottomline it rejects Free Will. It may strike you, but Limited Free Will is NOT compatible with Compatibilism, because it allows limited Free Will, where Compatibilism does not.

As I've stated repeatedly, I don't know what exactly "limited free will" means in your mind, although you keep saying it is not compatibilism. That doesn't tell me what it is. And I don't know what you think you are saying with an expression like "compatibilism is compatible with determinism". I keep explaining to you that compatibilism is the position that free will (not compatibilism!) is compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue over the definition of free will, and that sounds very much like what you are doing with your expression "limited free will". Hence, I am calling you out on that. I want to know how your definition of limited free will differs from anything that compatibilists like Dennett have said.

Nonetheless you have odd objections calling it post-modernist rhetoric. and an apparent lack of understanding. Chaos Theory does not come off as any such thing, I am NOT bandying it about. I am using it appropriately in the context of the natural nature of human will.

I said nothing at all about chaos theory that could lead anyone to believe I have misunderstood it in any way. All I was saying was that your use of chaos theory was completely unhelpful in telling us how limited free will differs from the concept of free will that a compatibilist might use. That is all. Why is this so hard for you to understand?

No handwaving on my part, but I see it from your perspective concerning your attitude concerning my references.

My problem is that your references so far don't appear to show how limited free will is not consistent with compatibilism. If you could do that, they might seem more relevant to me. But my pleas for a clarification in your own words simply get ignored.

IT is not compatible with Compatibilism as defined. Compatibilism DOES NOt acknowledge any true Free Will

Free will is in the definition of compatibilism. It is what compatibilists take to be compatible with determinism! At some point you must realize this. The argument for a compatibilist entails defining free will as a valid concept within a determinist framework.

I see a problem with your comprehension of the English language, obfuscation and dodging in and out of semantics.

Your the "greased pig!"

And I see a problem with your comprehension of compatibilism as a philosophical stance. You understand English, just not compatibilism. I still find your "limited free will" term to be quite slippery.

 

[shunyadragon]

We needn't argue over the Scientific American article, although I think you are objecting more to the background of the person who wrote the article rather than the merits of his scientific objections to a popular interpretation of Libet. You haven't made clear how Libet is in any way incompatible with a compatibilist position. So I regard it as a red herring.

I do not argue that Libet is incompatible with the compatibilist position, In fact it is because incompatibilism does not acknowledge any genuine Free Will.

What you say here doesn't make any sense. You can't define compatibilism without believing that it is compatible with free will. Hence, the name. What compatibilists do is argue for a definition of free will that makes sense within a determinist frame of reference. If you don't get that, then you really don't understand the difference between compatibilism and hard determinism.

I believe the definitions I provided were specific. Compatibilism is not compatible with Free Will. It only acknowledges the illusion of Free Will.

As I've stated repeatedly, I don't know what exactly "limited free will" means in your mind, although you keep saying it is not compatibilism. That doesn't tell me what it is. And I don't know what you think you are saying with an expression like "compatibilism is compatible with determinism". I keep explaining to you that compatibilism is the position that free will (not compatibilism!) is compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue over the definition of free will, and that sounds very much like what you are doing with your expression "limited free will". Hence, I am calling you out on that. I want to know how your definition of limited free will differs from anything that compatibilists like Dennett have said.

Simply as I described, It actually means humans have limited free will. Compatibilism does not. I have described limited free will in previous posts.

I said nothing at all about chaos theory that could lead anyone to believe I have misunderstood it in any way. All I was saying was that your use of chaos theory was completely unhelpful in telling us how limited free will differs from the concept of free will that a compatibilist might use. That is all. Why is this so hard for you to understand?

I do believe you "dismissed Chaos Theory, and do not understand its application to 'Limited Free Will.'

My problem is that your references so far don't appear to show how limited free will is not consistent with compatibilism. If you could do that, they might seem more relevant to me. But my pleas for a clarification in your own words simply get ignored.

That's your problem not mine. Again . . . Limited Free Will allows for Free Will. Compatibilism considers human Free Will an illusion as defined.

Free will is in the definition of compatibilism. It is what compatibilists take to be compatible with determinism! At some point you must realize this. The argument for a compatibilist entails defining free will as a valid concept within a determinist framework.

Free Will is in the definition of compatibilism, but compatibilism considers Free Will an illusion and not really Free Will as defined, Limited Free Will considers humans to actually have limited Free Will.

And I see a problem with your comprehension of compatibilism as a philosophical stance. You understand English, just not compatibilism.

I see it as your problem not accepting the definitions provided. Yes, there is a major disagreement between our views of and definition of Compatibilism.

Over the many references I have read many wrestle with the problem of Moral Responsibility and determinism, Some advocates of Compatibilism argue that this view resolves the problem I disagree.

I consider Moral Responsibility not necessary for determinism to be true. More Responsibility is simply a necessary factor in the Natural social evolution of humanity, that is essential in the survival of humanity, and not related to whether we have Free Will or not.

 

[Copernicus]

I do not argue that Libet is incompatible with the compatibilist position, In fact it is because incompatibilism does not acknowledge any genuine Free Will.

I believe the definitions I provided were specific. Compatibilism is not compatible with Free Will. It only acknowledges the illusion of Free Will.

Yes, given some of the ways people in a philosophical debate about determinism define free will, it could be called an illusion. Daniel Dennett, a leading compatibilist, often calls it the "illusion of free will". But Dennett has also surveyed different definitions of free will and points out that ordinary usage is not incompatible with determinism. I myself explained when we appear to have free will--before an action is taken and options are available--and when not--after an action is taken and no options are available except in hindsight.

Simply as I described, It actually means humans have limited free will. Compatibilism does not. I have described limited free will in previous posts.

Not sufficiently for me, and you have resisted my attempts to get you to clarify beyond what you had already written.

I do believe you "dismissed Chaos Theory, and do not understand its application to 'Limited Free Will.'

If you keep saying this after I have explicitly denied it more than once, you are lying. I never said anything to lead you to believe that I dismissed chaos theory, only your reference to it in something you wrote. You are very correct that I do not understand its application to 'Limited Free Will', and I would very much appreciate it if you would explain that to me. It is the kind of thing I have been asking for from you.

...My problem is that your references so far don't appear to show how limited free will is not consistent with compatibilism. If you could do that, they might seem more relevant to me. But my pleas for a clarification in your own words simply get ignored.

That' syour problem not mine.

Well, duh! That's why I keep asking you for a clarification. If you are unwilling to even attempt one, I think I've put in enough effort here. I keep hoping that you'll at least try. I respect your intelligence, but not your stubbornness.

Free Will is in the definition of compatibilism, but compatibilism considers Free Will an illusion and not really Free Will as defined, Limited Free Will considers humans to actually have limited Free Will.

I believe that Dennett, a well-known compatibilist, would find nothing to disagree with here except where you are saying that limited free will is not compatibilism. He is quite comfortable with saying that free will can be defined in a way that makes it an illusion, but that does not reflect normal English usage of the expression. I explained the difference above in terms of having choices in reality vs. having choices in hindsight. The past is already determined, so no viable choices exist any longer. The future is always undetermined, so viable choices always exist. Free will is an illusion only when viewing it as hindsight. Is that not what you mean by "limited free will"? If not, then what do you mean?

I see it as your problem not accepting the definitions provided,

I have yet to see a coherent, concise definition of limited free will that renders it incompatible with the compatibilist position. As for definitions, I accept the fact that more than one definition can be assigned to words, so I tend not to reject them out of hand.

 

[Koldo]

Yes, given some of the ways people in a philosophical debate about determinism define free will, it could be called an illusion. Daniel Dennett, a leading compatibilist, often calls it the "illusion of free will". But Dennett has also surveyed different definitions of free will and points out that ordinary usage is not incompatible with determinism. I myself explained when we appear to have free will--before an action is taken and options are available--and when not--after an action is taken and no options are available except in hindsight.



Not sufficiently for me, and you have resisted my attempts to get you to clarify beyond what you had already written.




If you keep saying this after I have explicitly denied it more than once, you are lying. I never said anything to lead you to believe that I dismissed chaos theory, only your reference to it in something you wrote. You are very correct that I do not understand its application to 'Limited Free Will', and I would very much appreciate it if you would explain that to me. It is the kind of thing I have been asking for from you.




Well, duh! That's why I keep asking you for a clarification. If you are unwilling to even attempt one, I think I've put in enough effort here. I keep hoping that you'll at least try. I respect your intelligence, but not your stubbornness.




I believe that Dennett, a well-known compatibilist, would find nothing to disagree with here except where you are saying that limited free will is not compatibilism. He is quite comfortable with saying that free will can be defined in a way that makes it an illusion, but that does not reflect normal English usage of the expression. I explained the difference above in terms of having choices in reality vs. having choices in hindsight. The past is already determined, so no viable choices exist any longer. The future is always undetermined, so viable choices always exist. Free will is an illusion only when viewing it as hindsight. Is that not what you mean by "limited free will"? If not, then what do you mean?



I have yet to see a coherent, concise definition of limited free will that renders it incompatible with the compatibilist position. As for definitions, I accept the fact that more than one definition can be assigned to words, so I tend not to reject them out of hand.

Let me try to elucidate what is happening from what I could gather:

@shunyadragon holds libertarian free will as true, with the caveat that he thinks of social and biological (and maybe spiritual?) conditions as sufficient to limit it because of their influence, up to a certain extent. Thus why he calls it limited free will... However, those of us that have read quite a bit about the subject won't see the point of this distinction since free will has never been claimed to be free from the influence of those conditions.

 

[shunyadragon]

Yes, given some of the ways people in a philosophical debate about determinism define free will, it could be called an illusion. Daniel Dennett, a leading compatibilist, often calls it the "illusion of free will". But Dennett has also surveyed different definitions of free will and points out that ordinary usage is not incompatible with determinism. I myself explained when we appear to have free will--before an action is taken and options are available--and when not--after an action is taken and no options are available except in hindsight.



Not sufficiently for me, and you have resisted my attempts to get you to clarify beyond what you had already written.




If you keep saying this after I have explicitly denied it more than once, you are lying. I never said anything to lead you to believe that I dismissed chaos theory, only your reference to it in something you wrote. You are very correct that I do not understand its application to 'Limited Free Will', and I would very much appreciate it if you would explain that to me. It is the kind of thing I have been asking for from you.




Well, duh! That's why I keep asking you for a clarification. If you are unwilling to even attempt one, I think I've put in enough effort here. I keep hoping that you'll at least try. I respect your intelligence, but not your stubbornness.




I believe that Dennett, a well-known compatibilist, would find nothing to disagree with here except where you are saying that limited free will is not compatibilism. He is quite comfortable with saying that free will can be defined in a way that makes it an illusion, but that does not reflect normal English usage of the expression. I explained the difference above in terms of having choices in reality vs. having choices in hindsight. The past is already determined, so no viable choices exist any longer. The future is always undetermined, so viable choices always exist. Free will is an illusion only when viewing it as hindsight. Is that not what you mean by "limited free will"? If not, then what do you mean?



I have yet to see a coherent, concise definition of limited free will that renders it incompatible with the compatibilist position. As for definitions, I accept the fact that more than one definition can be assigned to words, so I tend not to reject them out of hand.

Lets repeat again, again and again . . .

This defines my view of Compatibilism, We disagree, but I do not believe I need to repeat this again.

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Consider the following incompatibilist objection to the classical compatibilist account of free will:

If determinism is true, and if at any given time, an unimpeded agent is completely determined to have the wants that she does have, and if those wants causally determine her actions, then, even though she does do what she wants to do, she cannot ever do otherwise. She satisfies the classical compatibilist conditions for free will. But free will requires the ability to do otherwise, and determinism is incompatible with this. Hence, the classical compatibilist account of free will is inadequate. Determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility because determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise.

The classical compatibilist account of freedom set out thus far can be thought of as accounting for one-way freedom, which fixes only on what a person does do, not on what alternatives she had to what she did. The incompatibilist challenge at issue here is that such freedom, even if necessary, is insufficient in the absence of a further freedom to do other than as one does.

I believe this reference supported my argument, No need to reference again . .

The following article is very long and goes into considerable detail concerning research into the nature of human will and the role of determinism in the process.

Internal and External Constraints on Free Will Essay | Bartleby​

Free Essay: Internal and External Constraints on Free Will The concept of free will in and of itself is a complex issue with many factors weighing heavily...
www.bartleby.com

Conclusions

Free will is an elusive but crucial concept. For many years we have known that the functioning of our brain has to do not only with the belief that we have free will but also with the existence of free will itself. Evidence of the unconscious start of movement, highlighted by the RP signal, has led to believe that we had reached an experimental proof of the non-existence of free will—which many already claimed at a theoretical level based on the argument of the incompatibility between determinism and freedom. Along with other evidence provided by experimental psychology, the branch of studies inaugurated by Libet has contributed to seeing free will as an illusion: this view seemed to be reliably supported by science, and in particular by neuroscience. Recent studies, however, seem to question this paradigm, which sees the initiation and conscious control of the action as the first requirement of free will, allegedly proving that there are no such things.

. . .

According to Craver (2007), a mechanistic explanation is able to lead to an inter-field integration. There are two relevant aspects to this approach. The functional knowledge that can be drawn from psychological research is a tool to identify neural mechanisms; the knowledge of the brain structure can guide the construction of far more sophisticated psychological models (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). The index of free will that I am proposing (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015)—despite surely needing further refinement—might be useful to explore the brain mechanisms that underlie what appears in behavior as “free will”, which no longer seems to be an illusion, not even for neuroscientific research.

As far as how I define Potential Limited Free Will, First the conclusions in above article does not accept the conclusions based on Libet's research.

Potential Limited Free Will accepts basic natural determinism, but does not accept the Hard Determinism as it applies to Free Will. There are many factors that limit Free Will making Libertarian Free will untenable. Limited Free will allows a limited range of possible freedom of choice. I believe the above reference acknowledges that possibility,

The role of Chaos Theory is that the variable of all cause and effect outcomes in nature including the variations of the outcomes of the human decision making process, There are natural limitation of all cause and effect outcomes based on the number of variables. Human choice options come under the same concepts of Chaos Theory as in Nature, I believe the research in the above article demonstrated this variability that in the end does not exclude limited Free Will decisions.

 

[robocop (actually)]

I believe everything is "predetermined" (actually existing together through time) and the only randomness is in things being unknown.

 

[shunyadragon]

Let me try to elucidate what is happening from what I could gather:

@shunyadragon holds libertarian free will as true,

No

with the caveat that he thinks of social and biological (and maybe spiritual?) conditions as sufficient to limit it because of their influence, up to a certain extent. Thus why he calls it limited free will... However, those of us that have read quite a bit about the subject won't see the point of this distinction since free will has never been claimed to be free from the influence of those conditions.

See post #527

 

[shunyadragon]

I believe everything is "predetermined" (actually existing together through time) and the only randomness is in things being unknown.

OK! You believe your a Robocop and the rest of us are robots.

By the way. I have demonstrated the severe limits of what people call randomness in nature. The only thing considered truly random in nature is the 'timing' of the cause and effect outcomes. ALL cause and effect events have determined natural causes an outcomes are limited to a range of possible outcomes based on the natural variables.

 

[robocop (actually)]

OK! You believe your a Robocop and the rest of us are robots.

By the way. I have demonstrated the severe limits of what people call randomness in nature. The only thing considered truly random in nature is the 'timing' of the cause and effect outcomes. ALL cause and effect events have determined natural causes an outcomes are limited to a range of possible outcomes based on the natural variables.

OK it actually means that I support robocops in society but I'm going to assume you agree with me.

 

[shunyadragon]

OK it actually means that I support robocops in society but I'm going to assume you agree with me.

Agreed as far as robocops, but not humans.

 

[muhammad_isa]

You can't define compatibilism without believing that it is compatible with free will..

Agreed upon.
I believe that free-will, as normally understood, is compatible with a fixed-future.

The confusion arises due to it not being understood what actually FIXES the future.
That would be our actions, but people can't grasp this, as they see it as "already set".

 

[Koldo]

No

See post #527

Ok. I just did, but for now I still stand by how I have elucidated your position.

Your link to the essay concerning internal and external constraints doesn't use standard terminology. It states that a (libertarian) free decision requires the absence of any interference, thus why you feel the need to attach the word 'limited' to 'free will' to properly represent your perspective.

The problem, however, is that this interference has never been denied by libertarian free will proponents. In other words, in that essay the terminology of choice is setting up a strawman when trying to represent their position.

 

[robocop (actually)]

Agreed as far as robocops, but not humans.

So you believe in free will? (I don't)

 

[shunyadragon]

So you believe in free will? (I don't)

I believe in the concept of the 'Potential Limited Free Will' as described in post #527. I do not believe in Libertarian Free Will.

 

[robocop (actually)]

I believe in the concept of the 'Potential Limited Free Will' as described in post #527. I do not believe in Libertarian Free Will.

I've written books on the subject but I'm not feeling up to reading post #527. Sorry. Have a good day.

 

[The Hammer]

Free will does not exist. Inasmuch as "free" means "without outside influence".

 

[muhammad_isa]

The role of Chaos Theory is that the variable of all cause and effect outcomes in nature including the variations of the outcomes of the human decision making process, There are natural limitation of all cause and effect outcomes based on the number of variables. Human choice options come under the same concepts of Chaos Theory as in Nature, I believe the research in the above article demonstrated this variability that in the end does not exclude limited Free Will decisions.

I think you are complicating matters.
The definition of free-will that most people accept, is one of being responsible
for their actions .. with the normal 'legal' exceptions.

 

[shunyadragon]

Ok. I just did, but for now I still stand by how I have elucidated your position.

Again as described in post #527 this definitely does not reflect my beliefs. Potential Limited Free Wil does advocate that by far most of our choices are limited by the many factors of natural determinism, Our Freedom of choices is very limited.

Your link to the essay concerning internal and external constraints doesn't use standard terminology. It states that a (libertarian) free decision requires the absence of any interference, thus why you feel the need to attach the word 'limited' to 'free will' to properly represent your perspective.

The reference is in cery standard terminology as far as science is concerned. I detect a problem here of understanding science.

The problem, however, is that this interference has never been denied by libertarian free will proponents. In other words, in that essay the terminology of choice is setting up a strawman when trying to represent their position.

No strawman. The reference is straight forward and specific.

I believe that according to Libertarian Free Will any possible interference does not constrain human ability to "do otherwise." Libertarian Free Wil" rejects determinism as it applies to human choice. If you propose something different please explain further.