Do you Think we have Free Will

[shunyadragon]

I think you are complicating matters.
The definition of free-will that most people accept, is one of being responsible
for their actions .. with the normal 'legal' exceptions.

Any supposed complications you perceive is based on the lack of knowledge of the math and science involved,

Your definition and your view applies to Libertarian Free Will only.

By any acceptable definition, Libertarian Free Will is not tenable even fudging possibilities around legal issues. We have a very limited range of options to do otherwise. I accept Natural Determinism, which documents many factors that limit our freedom of choice,

My references stand in post #527.

 

[shunyadragon]

Yes, given some of the ways people in a philosophical debate about determinism define free will, it could be called an illusion. Daniel Dennett, a leading compatibilist, often calls it the "illusion of free will". But Dennett has also surveyed different definitions of free will and points out that ordinary usage is not incompatible with determinism. I myself explained when we appear to have free will--before an action is taken and options are available--and when not--after an action is taken and no options are available except in hindsight.



Not sufficiently for me, and you have resisted my attempts to get you to clarify beyond what you had already written.




If you keep saying this after I have explicitly denied it more than once, you are lying. I never said anything to lead you to believe that I dismissed chaos theory, only your reference to it in something you wrote. You are very correct that I do not understand its application to 'Limited Free Will', and I would very much appreciate it if you would explain that to me. It is the kind of thing I have been asking for from you.




Well, duh! That's why I keep asking you for a clarification. If you are unwilling to even attempt one, I think I've put in enough effort here. I keep hoping that you'll at least try. I respect your intelligence, but not your stubbornness.




I believe that Dennett, a well-known compatibilist, would find nothing to disagree with here except where you are saying that limited free will is not compatibilism. He is quite comfortable with saying that free will can be defined in a way that makes it an illusion, but that does not reflect normal English usage of the expression. I explained the difference above in terms of having choices in reality vs. having choices in hindsight. The past is already determined, so no viable choices exist any longer. The future is always undetermined, so viable choices always exist. Free will is an illusion only when viewing it as hindsight. Is that not what you mean by "limited free will"? If not, then what do you mean?



I have yet to see a coherent, concise definition of limited free will that renders it incompatible with the compatibilist position. As for definitions, I accept the fact that more than one definition can be assigned to words, so I tend not to reject them out of hand.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a difficult read I had to go over a number of times, I did find a reference that ther was an option of edited Compatibilism that presents a case that supports a "Potential Limited Free Will" that is not Classical Compatibilism.

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

plato.stanford.edu

1.1 Determinism and Alternative Possibilities​

Compatibilists who accept that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility must show what is wrong with this powerful argument. They also should offer some account of what John Martin Fischer (1994) has called regulative control—a form of control agents possess when they can bring about X and can refrain from bringing about X— that makes clear how it is possible even at a determined world. We will first consider three different compatibilist attempts to unseat the Consequence Argument. Then we will consider how some compatibilists, the so-called New Dispositionalists, explain regulative control, that is, how they might explain the freedom to do otherwise in a way that is compatible with causal determinism.

 

[Copernicus]

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a difficult read I had to go over a number of times, I did find a reference that ther was an option of edited Compatibilism that presents a case that supports a "Potential Limited Free Will" that is not Classical Compatibilism.

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

plato.stanford.edu

Thanks. I wanted to get beyond Section 2.2 with you, because the so-called position on compatibilism dates back to the 1960s, and there has been considerable discussion in the literature since then. I am not a credentialed philosopher, so I am not going to pretend to be familiar with all of it. I am more or less persuaded to Dennett's position, which is that we should be concerned with concepts of free will that are closer to ordinary English usage than the specialized and nuanced ones we find in many of those highly technical discussions of the controversy. After all, I am a linguist. So I think that the way we actually use words and expressions is more important than the way we might want them to be used. And that is what you find in Dennett's various writings on the subject--an enumeration of different meanings that people attribute to the expression of "free will". Causal determinism is not so fraught, because it is a fairly technical term to begin with.

Regarding Bartleby, I can't get past the paywall without giving them a credit card, and I am just not going to do that. Generally speaking, I won't invest money in helping people to defend their own arguments in discussion groups like this. Sorry if that makes me sound like a cheapskate, but I'm happy to be considered such if necessary. Also, I won't read long articles or books because someone tells me they refute my position. Again, I regard it as a responsibility of the person making the argument to summarize such materials in a way that addresses the issue under discussion. The references are helpful as a sanity check, but I'm too old to invest a lot of my remaining heartbeats in reading assignments that may turn up nothing particularly interesting or convincing.

1.1 Determinism and Alternative Possibilities​

Compatibilists who accept that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility must show what is wrong with this powerful argument. They also should offer some account of what John Martin Fischer (1994) has called regulative control—a form of control agents possess when they can bring about X and can refrain from bringing about X— that makes clear how it is possible even at a determined world. We will first consider three different compatibilist attempts to unseat the Consequence Argument. Then we will consider how some compatibilists, the so-called New Dispositionalists, explain regulative control, that is, how they might explain the freedom to do otherwise in a way that is compatible with causal determinism.

Sorry, but you made a typo there. You are quoting from section 4.1, not section 1.1. And I agree with you that reading that entire Stanford article is taxing. Frankly, I'm not much enamored to the dispositionalist position described in that section. Regardless of that, I want to come back to my much simpler position that I think may be more like Dennett's (although I have regrettably never met or talked with the man). His point is that there are limited "varieties of free will worth wanting." The Stanford article mentions this in section 1.1, but then devotes the remainder of the essay to criticisms incompatibilists have made and responses to those criticisms in the literature. As far as I have tried to follow them, the compatibilist reactions have shed no more light on the subject than the incompatibilist attacks. All too often, the question of how to define "free will" is left unspecified, even though it really is the crux of the matter.

My view, which I have stated several times now, is that free will can be construed as an illusion or not, depending on what perspective (or "stance" to use one of Dennett's favorite terms) one takes. People do not live in the past or the future. They live in the moment. That's when choices are actually made. However, one can see a choice as not yet made or as already made in the past. Those are two very different perspectives. IOW, a choice is either forward-looking or backward-looking. However, the choice itself is made in a brief span of time between the past and the present. Let's call this brief span of time the moment. An exercise of will or volition takes place in the moment. Before the moment, free will is very real, because there are alternative options that an agent can take into consideration before exercising volition. From that perspective, free will is not an illusion. After the moment, an agent can only view those alternatives as imaginary, so free will is an illusion from that perspective. When we talk about determinism, we take a godlike third person view of the agentive act. We are outside of the temporal sequence and looking at both past and future perspectives on it simultaneously. We see that agent's action from both sides of "the moment", so the question of whether free will is real or just an illusion is not resolvable from that perspective.

Does that relate to anything you are trying to say about "limited free will"? I'm just trying to get the sense of what you mean by limitations on free will. I didn't see you as trying to defend libertarian free will, as Koldo tried to say earlier.

 

[muhammad_isa]

Any supposed complications you perceive is based on the lack of knowledge of the math and science involved..

It has nothing to do with maths & science.
We are talking about the definition of free-will, as the majority understand it.
One doesn't need to be a scientist, to appreciate that.

We have a very limited range of options to do otherwise..

The law does not agree.
Unless we are certified insane(or a minor), we do INDEED have the capacity to make reasonable choices.

 

[Polymath257]

Agreed upon.
I believe that free-will, as normally understood, is compatible with a fixed-future.

The confusion arises due to it not being understood what actually FIXES the future.
That would be our actions, but people can't grasp this, as they see it as "already set".

And the point is that *which* action we take is also 'fixed', which nullifies free will. Our actions are part of the fixed future.

 

[Polymath257]

It has nothing to do with maths & science.
We are talking about the definition of free-will, as the majority understand it.
One doesn't need to be a scientist, to appreciate that.

That seems to ignore that if the science and math says there can only be one possible future, that would negate the existence of free will.

The law does not agree.
Unless we are certified insane(or a minor), we do INDEED have the capacity to make reasonable choices.

Legal fictions are just that: fictions. You see, laws are *human* inventions and reflect the biases we have. Those biases might not be accurate.

 

[Copernicus]

That seems to ignore that if the science and math says there can only be one possible future, that would negate the existence of free will.

That depends on how you define the concept of free will. Math and science are just tools that people use for calculating outcomes. As muhammad_isa pointed out, you don't need to be either a mathematician or scientist to define free will, but you do have to base the definition on how people actually use the expression.

When people exercise volition, they are not aware of all the factors that determine their choices, but they are aware of alternative actions that they could take to achieve different outcomes. In that sense, they become part of the deterministic causal chain leading up to a desirable result. That is, the agent's desires, goals, and priorities are what determine the action they choose from among available alternatives. There is freedom of choice insofar as they perceive their choices to be unimpeded. If, for example, they make a mistake in their calculation and fail to achieve the expected result, that outcome falls outside the scope of choice. Hence, if I swing a baseball bat, not knowing that you are standing behind me, and the bat strikes you in the head, then it would not be true that I hit you of my own free will, just that I swung the bat of my own free will. Whether or not I am judged responsible for your injury might depend on an assessment of who was most responsible for the circumstances that caused the accident. Maybe you weren't supposed to be standing where you were when I swung the bat. Maybe I failed to check whether there was anyone behind me. In a deterministic universe, of course, it was always inevitable that you would be struck by the bat at that point in time, but that's got nothing to do with the scope of my free will when it comes to assessing responsibility.

Legal fictions are just that: fictions. You see, laws are *human* inventions and reflect the biases we have. Those biases might not be accurate.

Nevertheless, expressions like "free will" are also human inventions that reflect those biases. Laws exist in order to make interactions between humans reasonably safe and comfortable. Humans make those laws, because they generally prefer not to suffer harm to themselves and others.

 

[muhammad_isa]

And the point is that *which* action we take is also 'fixed', which nullifies free will. Our actions are part of the fixed future.

As I say, many people can't grasp it, and think I can't put 2 & 2 together and make 4.

It really does NOT nullify free-will .. the future is FIXED by our actions.
You are putting the cart before the horse. You ASSUME that if the future can be known, then
the known future fixes our actions. That is NOT necessarily so.

 

[muhammad_isa]

..You see, laws are *human* inventions and reflect the biases we have. Those biases might not be accurate.

I know very well that laws can be mistaken.
..but most people deem it reasonable that we should be held accountable for our actions,
as do I.

 

[Polymath257]

As I say, many people can't grasp it, and think I can't put 2 & 2 together and make 4.

It really does NOT nullify free-will .. the future is FIXED by our actions.
You are putting the cart before the horse. You ASSUME that if the future can be known, then
the known future fixes our actions. That is NOT necessarily so.

OK, the future is fixed by our actions. But are our actions fixed? If they are, then the choices are not free (they could not be otherwise because they are fixed). But our actions (and choices) are part of the events in the future and, in a deterministic system, are fixed.

I am NOT assuming that if the future can be known, the *future* fixes our actions. I am saying that if the future can be known, our actions are fixed and thereby not free. How, if the future can be known, is it possible for our actions NOT to be fixed?

I know very well that laws can be mistaken.
..but most people deem it reasonable that we should be held accountable for our actions,
as do I.

And so do I. The question is why. What justifies that legal fiction?

That depends on how you define the concept of free will. Math and science are just tools that people use for calculating outcomes. As muhammad_isa pointed out, you don't need to be either a mathematician or scientist to define free will, but you do have to base the definition on how people actually use the expression.

When people exercise volition, they are not aware of all the factors that determine their choices, but they are aware of alternative actions that they could take to achieve different outcomes. In that sense, they become part of the deterministic causal chain leading up to a desirable result. That is, the agent's desires, goals, and priorities are what determine the action they choose from among available alternatives. There is freedom of choice insofar as they perceive their choices to be unimpeded. If, for example, they make a mistake in their calculation and fail to achieve the expected result, that outcome falls outside the scope of choice. Hence, if I swing a baseball bat, not knowing that you are standing behind me, and the bat strikes you in the head, then it would not be true that I hit you of my own free will, just that I swung the bat of my own free will. Whether or not I am judged responsible for your injury might depend on an assessment of who was most responsible for the circumstances that caused the accident. Maybe you weren't supposed to be standing where you were when I swung the bat. Maybe I failed to check whether there was anyone behind me. In a deterministic universe, of course, it was always inevitable that you would be struck by the bat at that point in time, but that's got nothing to do with the scope of my free will when it comes to assessing responsibility.

But the issue is whether the choice that they made was already determined. Yes, they have a choice, but is it *free*? COULD they have made a different choice? or is it simply an illusion that they had freedom to choose otherwise?

And this is where the science comes in. For the choice to be 'free', there has to be more than one possible future. And, it is far from clear that the science allows for such.

Nevertheless, expressions like "free will" are also human inventions that reflect those biases. Laws exist in order to make interactions between humans reasonably safe and comfortable. Humans make those laws, because they generally prefer not to suffer harm to themselves and others.

Yes. And again, the issue is not whether they make choices. The issue is whether those choices are actually free or whether they were predetermined.

 

[The Hammer]

Yes. And again, the issue is not whether they make choices. The issue is whether those choices are actually free or whether they were predetermined

Maybe not predetermined, but certainly not without external influence, so not entirely free.

 

[Polymath257]

Maybe not predetermined, but certainly not without external influence, so not entirely free.

So, if not completely predetermined, how much flexibility is there? How is it put into effect? What mechanisms allow us to choose a future in those cases where we can?

 

[muhammad_isa]

OK, the future is fixed by our actions..

Good .. but do you really mean it?

But are our actions fixed?

Yes .. fixed by what we choose.

If they are, then the choices are not free (they could not be otherwise because they are fixed).

..but it is not the fact they are "fixed" that troubles you..
You just agreed that our actions can be "fixed" by what we choose.

But our actions (and choices) are part of the events in the future and, in a deterministic system, are fixed.

They are "fixed" whether the system is deterministic or not.
i.e. the future must be something

I am NOT assuming that if the future can be known, the *future* fixes our actions. I am saying that if the future can be known, our actions are fixed and thereby not free.

It's the same thing .. just another way of saying it.
In my opinion, you see the passage of time as "ruling the roost".
..so this talk about it being "fixed"

As I say .. it HAS to be something !

How, if the future can be known, is it possible for our actions NOT to be fixed?

Perhaps, see it in the light of the choices that we will make freely, can be known by an agent who is
not part of this universe?
..but that's hardly the point .. the point is that it is NOT necessary for our choices to be affected
by knowledge that we do not possess .. such as what we will choose.
The choice is NOT necessarily affected by another's knowledge .. there is no such mechanism, that
invisibly makes us choose against our will.

But the issue is whether the choice that they made was already determined.

That makes little sense from a global perspective .. "already determined" is constrained by the passage of time in this universe.

COULD they have made a different choice?

Yes .. if they had wanted to.

or is it simply an illusion that they had freedom to choose otherwise?

No illusion .. responsibility is not an illusion.

And this is where the science comes in. For the choice to be 'free', there has to be more than one possible future.

No .. I don't agree.
There IS only one future, just like there is only one past.

What I think you mean, is that we must be free to choose what that future will be .. right?

The issue is whether those choices are actually free or whether they were predetermined.

Well, if they were "predetermined" by some unknown force(s), then our choices would not be free.
..but I do not believe that they are. Not to the extent that our choices are beyond our control,
in any case.

 

[robocop (actually)]

I believe in the concept of the 'Potential Limited Free Will' as described in post #527. I do not believe in Libertarian Free Will.

I tried to read some of your post. The most I got was from those two terms in this post right here.

Potential limited free will is exactly what I think; we measure our thought after we do it. That says we don't have free will.

I do not believe a person can make a choice, though whether you are exerting extra effort to win in life at this very moment is the difference of whether you will succeed or fail.

 

[shunyadragon]

I tried to read some of your post. The most I got was from those two terms in this post right here.

Potential limited free will is exactly what I think; we measure our thought after we do it. That says we don't have free will.

This is the view of Libet's old work. I gave references of more recent work that demonstrated that "Limited
free will is a better alternate explanation, and you have failed to respond.

I do not believe a person can make a choice, though whether you are exerting extra effort to win in life at this very moment is the difference of whether you will succeed or fail.

Does not make sense.

 

[shunyadragon]

It has nothing to do with maths & science.

It has everything to do with math and science. The alternatives or relying on religious believes or old philosophical proposals is not longer net the standard today.

We are talking about the definition of free-will, as the majority understand it.
One doesn't need to be a scientist, to appreciate that.

Again no, the definition of Free will you propose is Libertarian Fee Will, and there are a number of other definitions that describe versions of Limited Free Will, and of course variations of determinism, and failed variation compatibilism.

The law does not agree.
Unless we are certified insane(or a minor), we do INDEED have the capacity to make reasonable choices.

Too simplistic to be real considering the many documented deterministic factors that limit out Free Will

 

[Copernicus]

But the issue is whether the choice that they made was already determined. Yes, they have a choice, but is it *free*? COULD they have made a different choice? or is it simply an illusion that they had freedom to choose otherwise?

I think that the issue is what it means to a human agent to make a free choice, not what it means to an omniscient observer of a causal deterministic system in which the human is an integral part of that system. After all, "free will" is a common expression used by human beings, so we ought to define from a human perspective. In human experience, determinism only makes sense in terms of past experiences. The past is fully determined and the agent has no freedom to change it. The future is unknown, so the agent is free to select among alternative actions, even if that freedom does not exist for the so-called external observer of conditions such as physical brain activity that determines the choice. Human agents make real choices based on calculations of likely outcomes, even if an omniscient observer would know for certain what those outcomes could be. And human agents are constantly revising a predictive model of imaginary outcomes--i.e. learning and changing behavioral strategies. Lack of free will involves unforeseen circumstances that thwart intention--for example tripping or slipping while walking. Past experience teaches us to watch where we are stepping so that we avoid tripping or slipping.

And this is where the science comes in. For the choice to be 'free', there has to be more than one possible future. And, it is far from clear that the science allows for such.

Nonsense. Free will has nothing at all to do with science. Human agents live in a chaotic environment where unpredictable events can thwart intentions. Hence, they need to be in a state of continual calculation of likely outcomes. It is absurd to claim that there is only one possible future, because the future can only be imaginary to a human. And human agents can imagine alternative outcomes that they have the option to try to bring about. If people were omniscient--fully knowledgeable of all possible outcomes of their actions--then they would lack free will. However, that is not how reality works. Free will is necessary to the survival not just of humans, but for all creatures that move around in a deterministic chaotic environment. The reality is that the future is not predictable to beings that live in linear temporal frames where the past is fixed and unchangeable, but the future is unknown and malleable.

Yes. And again, the issue is not whether they make choices. The issue is whether those choices are actually free or whether they were predetermined.

They may be predetermined from the perspective of an omniscient observer, but never from the perspective of a human being that can only experience reality one step at a time. We don't choose everything that happens to us, but our chaotic environment can be partially predicted on the basis of experiences that teach us how to navigate and survive it. Free will--the ability to choose from imagined outcomes of our actions--is what allows us to survive and adapt to changing circumstances. Our prioritized desires and goals determine which actions we choose to execute.

 

[muhammad_isa]

Too simplistic to be real..

..so the law is wrong, in holding people responsible for their actions?
It seems to me, that "this" is not science, but whacky thinking.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

It really does NOT nullify free-will .. the future is FIXED by our actions.

It's only Abrahamists that argue that a god can know the future perfectly yet mans will is not determined. It's an incoherent position - internally self-contradictory, but one he is forced to hold if he's to have an omniscient, just god that punishes for choices made (moral responsibility). They just keep insisting that these two are compatible.

No illusion .. responsibility is not an illusion.

The illusion referred to is that one could have chosen otherwise. Responsibility in the legal sense is a human construct, which is different from saying that the sun is responsible for the light and warmth that bathe Earth or that the conscience is responsible for our sense of what is good and proper and what is not. That's determinism (causality).

Moral responsibility has to do with blame and punishment, and it's based in an assumption that people could have behaved otherwise, and because they didn't, it's right to make them suffer even if the suffering serves no constructive purpose as with burning in hell for eternity for failure to conform to certain standards of behavior or failure to believe in and worship a specific deity.

so the law is wrong, in holding people responsible for their actions?

It is proper to write and enforce laws for the well-being of the majority just as it is proper for a parent to have rules and enforce them with punishment at times, but it is not appropriate to hold anybody morally responsible in the sense just described - deserving of punishment for punishment's sake just as we wouldn't hold a lion morally responsible for forcing sex on a lioness or killing a zebra. Man has evolved a conscience, but not everybody has one and not everyone feels compelled to obey it in the face of conflicting desires.

The purpose of the penal punishment is to remove a danger from the streets, to serve as a disincentive to not imitate or repeat that behavior, in some cases restitution (assessing damages), and hopefully, someday, to rehabilitate. All of that is constructive, and all consistent with humanist values. Throw in punishment for punishment's sake as in prison should be as unpleasant as possible because bad people deserve to suffer, and your back to Abrahamic values.

And this is the Abrahamist's dilemma. His god punishes gratuitously - there's no constructive value in keeping a soul conscious just to make it suffer, which is what the term moral responsibility implies - for acts that it foresaw before it created man. And so the Abrahamist simply keeps insisting that omniscience and moral responsibility leading to punishment for punishment's sake are compatible, and nobody else makes that argument.

Having said all of that, I can agree that wanting people to suffer for their actions is very human. The survivors of a killer want that killer to receive the longest sentence possible in the least pleasant place possible. Trump's detractors want more than just to have a criminal removed from the streets and his victims compensated from his savings. Many relish in his suffering. They want him to live a long life in prison hating every day, raging, feeling vengeful while powerless to get revenge, feeling cheated, and feeling humiliated.

But this is gratuitous suffering. It does nothing for Trump or anybody else.

Is Trump morally responsible for being a narcissistic sociopath. Did he choose the genes and parents that led to that outcome? Does he have the ability to be a different and better person? It doesn't seem like it. Does he have free will or is he a robot to a series of pathological urges?

The Grateful dead wrote a song called Victim Or The Crime about just this topic:

Patience runs out on the junkie
The dark side hires another soul
Did he steal his fate or earn it?
Was he force fed, did he learn it?
Whatever happened to his precious self-control?

Like him, I'm tired of trying to heal
This tomcat heart with which I'm blessed
Is destruction loving's twin?
May I chose to lose or win?
Maybe when my turn comes I will have guessed.

And so I wrestle with the angel
To see who'll reap the seeds I sow
Am I the driver or the driven?
Will I be damned to be forgiven?
Is there anybody here but me who needs to know?

What it is that feeds this fever
As the full moon pales and climbs
Am I living truth or rank deceiver?
Am I the victim or the crime?

 

[shunyadragon]

Thanks. I wanted to get beyond Section 2.2 with you, because the so-called position on compatibilism dates back to the 1960s, and there has been considerable discussion in the literature since then. I am not a credentialed philosopher, so I am not going to pretend to be familiar with all of it. I am more or less persuaded to Dennett's position, which is that we should be concerned with concepts of free will that are closer to ordinary English usage than the specialized and nuanced ones we find in many of those highly technical discussions of the controversy. After all, I am a linguist. So I think that the way we actually use words and expressions is more important than the way we might want them to be used. And that is what you find in Dennett's various writings on the subject--an enumeration of different meanings that people attribute to the expression of "free will". Causal determinism is not so fraught, because it is a fairly technical term to begin with.

Supposed "ordinary usage of English language: does not defend Dennett's position. I presented my view of Limited Dree Will in plain simple language, and you were unable to understand or acknowledge it. The references provided do support my view regardless.

Regarding Bartleby, I can't get past the paywall without giving them a credit card, and I am just not going to do that. Generally speaking, I won't invest money in helping people to defend their own arguments in discussion groups like this. Sorry if that makes me sound like a cheapskate, but I'm happy to be considered such if necessary. Also, I won't read long articles or books because someone tells me they refute my position. Again, I regard it as a responsibility of the person making the argument to summarize such materials in a way that addresses the issue under discussion. The references are helpful as a sanity check, but I'm too old to invest a lot of my remaining heartbeats in reading assignments that may turn up nothing particularly interesting or convincing.

This limitation on your part does not negate that the reference goes into considerable detail concerning the recent history since Libet up through the present research of the actual support for my view of a "Limited Free Will."

Sorry, but you made a typo there. You are quoting from section 4.1, not section 1.1. And I agree with you that reading that entire Stanford article is taxing. Frankly, I'm not much enamored to the dispositionalist position described in that section. Regardless of that, I want to come back to my much simpler position that I think may be more like Dennett's (although I have regrettably never met or talked with the man). His point is that there are limited "varieties of free will worth wanting." The Stanford article mentions this in section 1.1, but then devotes the remainder of the essay to criticisms incompatibilists have made and responses to those criticisms in the literature. As far as I have tried to follow them, the compatibilist reactions have shed no more light on the subject than the incompatibilist attacks. All too often, the question of how to define "free will" is left unspecified, even though it really is the crux of the matter.

Nonetheless of the typo, the reference does support what I call I call "Limited Free Will, Not being enamored with 4.1 doe not negate that there is support for a "Limited Free Will," It is clear and specific.

My view, which I have stated several times now, is that free will can be construed as an illusion or not, depending on what perspective (or "stance" to use one of Dennett's favorite terms) one takes. People do not live in the past or the future. They live in the moment.

The claim of "Living in the moment" does not negated the fact that out choices are limited by many deterministic factors such as the influence of the chain of cause and effect choices in the past, culture, religion and other documented factors.

I do not support the view that our Free Will is an illusion it too subjective. I go by the research cited to justify the concept of "Potential Limited Free Will."

That's when choices are actually made. However, one can see a choice as not yet made or as already made in the past. Those are two very different perspectives. IOW, a choice is either forward-looking or backward-looking. However, the choice itself is made in a brief span of time between the past and the present. Let's call this brief span of time the moment. An exercise of will or volition takes place in the moment. Before the moment, free will is very real, because there are alternative options that an agent can take into consideration before exercising volition. From that perspective, free will is not an illusion. After the moment, an agent can only view those alternatives as imaginary, so free will is an illusion from that perspective. When we talk about determinism, we take a godlike third person view of the agentive act. We are outside of the temporal sequence and looking at both past and future perspectives on it simultaneously. We see that agent's action from both sides of "the moment", so the question of whether free will is real or just an illusion is not resolvable from that perspective.

I disagree based on the research cited. Your view and that of Dennett, which neglects the documented factor that limit the out come of our choices to do otherwise.

Does that relate to anything you are trying to say about "limited free will"? I'm just trying to get the sense of what you mean by limitations on free will. I didn't see you as trying to defend libertarian free will, as Koldo tried to say earlier.

I do not remotely defend Libertarian Free Will, which is too close to Dennett's belief to be real. Both are not acceptable based on the research and evidence for "Limited Free Will." Libertarian Free Will" does not acknowledge the documented factors of Determinism that limits our Free Will choices. Even though the references use some more advanced language the conclusions are clear and specific.

Your negating and dismissing my references that support my view of a "Limited Free Will," including the list of documented factors that do limit our Free Will. See reference in next post.


The following debate between Dennett and Caruso is veery revealing. I actually do not agree with either extreme view, but like Caruso's description of Moral Responsibility. As stated before I do not believe Moral Responsibility is a factor as to whether we have Free will or not. Again Moral Responsibility is an evolved necessary factor of humans for the survival of the species, and not related to the question of whether we have Free Will or not. It is only recently that deterministic factors have been considered in questions of Justice for Moral Responsibility. The fact that there are documented many deterministic factors that limits our Moral Responsibility further negates the view of Libertarian Free Will and Dennett's belief.

On free will: Daniel Dennett and Gregg Caruso go head to head | Aeon Essays

Can we be held morally responsible for our actions? Yes, says Daniel Dennett. No, says Gregg Caruso. Reader, you decide

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Caruso: I don’t doubt that the sense of ‘desert’ you defend is the everyday sense. Keep in mind, though, that it is exactly this sense of desert that is used to justify retributivism. And nothing you have said suggests that you reject either of the two main tenets of retributivism – its backward-looking-ness (at least internal to the moral responsibility system) and its appeal to just deserts. Quite the opposite, you explicitly state that the premeditated murderer really does ‘deserve to go to prison for a very long time’, irrespective of future consequences in specific instances. I’m confused, then, why you continue to deny that you are a retributivist. It seems to me that your view is indistinguishable from retributivism. Yes, you support sentence reform and eliminating the death penalty, but that’s doesn’t make you a non-retributivist. But rather than get into a debate over your membership in the Retributivist Party, I think it would be more helpful to focus on specifics.