Do you Think we have Free Will

[Polymath257]

Good .. but do you really mean it?

Parts of the future are fixed by our actions. Our actions are fixed by our choices.

Now, are our choices fixed? COULD we have chosen otherwise or is it simply an illusion that we *feel* like we can?

Yes .. fixed by what we choose.

And what fixes what we choose?

..but it is not the fact they are "fixed" that troubles you..
You just agreed that our actions can be "fixed" by what we choose.

The problem is what fixes our choices. Are we actually free to make a different choice? if the future is known, then the answer is no. We could only choose what we actually did choose.

They are "fixed" whether the system is deterministic or not.
i.e. the future must be something

But is there only one possible future? If so, then we don't actually have a real choice, only an illusion of such.

It's the same thing .. just another way of saying it.
In my opinion, you see the passage of time as "ruling the roost".
..so this talk about it being "fixed"

As I say .. it HAS to be something !

Does it? Does the future of NOW actually *have* to be something fixed? if so, there can be no free choices.

Perhaps, see it in the light of the choices that we will make freely, can be known by an agent who is
not part of this universe?

If the choices can be known, then they are not truly free: we could have done no other. The very fact that the choices are *known* for a being outside of time and space means that they could not have been otherwise and that means they were not truly free.

..but that's hardly the point .. the point is that it is NOT necessary for our choices to be affected
by knowledge that we do not possess .. such as what we will choose.

The choices are not affected by the knowledge of an outside being. But whether the choices are free certainly is.

The choice is NOT necessarily affected by another's knowledge .. there is no such mechanism, that
invisibly makes us choose against our will.

but what makes our will what it is? Is the will also fixed? Could it be otherwise?

if the will is determined, it is not free.

That makes little sense from a global perspective .. "already determined" is constrained by the passage of time in this universe.

Nope. if it is known by an outside entity, then it could be nothing other than what it is. And that means that I don't truly have a free choice, only an illusion of one.

Yes .. if they had wanted to.

And what determines what they want?

No illusion .. responsibility is not an illusion.

Responsibility is a legal fiction. it is useful for societies to order themselves.

No .. I don't agree.
There IS only one future, just like there is only one past.

OK, so it is fixed and ALL of our choices are also fixed. And that means we could not choose otherwise. And that means we do not have free will.

What I think you mean, is that we must be free to choose what that future will be .. right?

Yes, and that freedom requires that there be more than one possible future.

Well, if they were "predetermined" by some unknown force(s), then our choices would not be free.
..but I do not believe that they are. Not to the extent that our choices are beyond our control,
in any case.

But 'our control' is also fixed if there s only one future. We don't have a choice on what we want.

 

[shunyadragon]

..so the law is wrong, in holding people responsible for their actions?

NO. I did not state that, Moral Responsibility is a necessary factor in the survival of the human species regardless of whether we are responsible for our actions or not. It is only contemporary justice systems that takes into deterministic factors in terms of Moral Responsibility, IT these deterministic factors that are documented and others that negates the validity of "Libertarian Free Will."

Laws can be right or wrong, Hist0ry is a witness that Laws reflect the times and culture, and are not uniformly "just" in history, In fact religous legal systems like Islamic systems are notoriously "unjust" based on ancient cultural beliefs

the culture and timesIt seems to me, that "this" is not science, but whacky thinking.

. . . because you begate the contemporary science that addresses Free will and Determinism.

 

[Polymath257]

I think that the issue is what it means to a human agent to make a free choice, not what it means to an omniscient observer of a causal deterministic system in which the human is an integral part of that system. After all, "free will" is a common expression used by human beings, so we ought to define from a human perspective. In human experience, determinism only makes sense in terms of past experiences. The past is fully determined and the agent has no freedom to change it. The future is unknown, so the agent is free to select among alternative actions, even if that freedom does not exist for the so-called external observer of conditions such as physical brain activity that determines the choice. Human agents make real choices based on calculations of likely outcomes, even if an omniscient observer would know for certain what those outcomes could be. And human agents are constantly revising a predictive model of imaginary outcomes--i.e. learning and changing behavioral strategies. Lack of free will involves unforeseen circumstances that thwart intention--for example tripping or slipping while walking. Past experience teaches us to watch where we are stepping so that we avoid tripping or slipping.

And the question is whether the choices made are already determined by the past. Is the agent *actually* free to select among possible alternatives or is it simply an illusion that they feel like they do? Even if they *want* the alternative, are they free to *want* something other? or is that desire also determined by past events?

Yes, we make choices based on perceived likelihood of possible futures. But, given that information, is the choice already determined? yes, we learn and change behaviors. But could we have chosen not to do those new behaviors or was the change determined by past events?

Nonsense. Free will has nothing at all to do with science. Human agents live in a chaotic environment where unpredictable events can thwart intentions. Hence, they need to be in a state of continual calculation of likely outcomes. It is absurd to claim that there is only one possible future, because the future can only be imaginary to a human.

Yes, *we* don't know what the future will be, but if it is determined that is irrelevant. If even our choices, even our desires, even the information available to us are ALL determined, then the choices, actions, etc are not *truly* free.

And human agents can imagine alternative outcomes that they have the option to try to bring about. If people were omniscient--fully knowledgeable of all possible outcomes of their actions--then they would lack free will.

They would lack free will either way. They just have an illusion of free will when they don't know the future.

However, that is not how reality works. Free will is necessary to the survival not just of humans, but for all creatures that move around in a deterministic chaotic environment. The reality is that the future is not predictable to beings that live in linear temporal frames where the past is fixed and unchangeable, but the future is unknown and malleable.

Yes, having a will is necessary. The freedom of that will is not. if the choices are fixed, if the desires are fixed, if everything is fixed, then there is no freedom in the choices.

They may be predetermined from the perspective of an omniscient observer, but never from the perspective of a human being that can only experience reality one step at a time.

Which simply means our perspective is illusory. We have limited perspective and miss the real picture where all of our choices are already fixed.

We don't choose everything that happens to us, but our chaotic environment can be partially predicted on the basis of experiences that teach us how to navigate and survive it. Free will--the ability to choose from imagined outcomes of our actions--is what allows us to survive and adapt to changing circumstances. Our prioritized desires and goals determine which actions we choose to execute.

The key here is that word 'imagined'. That is why the freedom is illusory and not real.

 

[muhammad_isa]

It's only Abrahamists that argue that a god can know the future perfectly yet mans will is not determined. It's an incoherent position..

It really isn't .. but you don't believe that there is something other than this universe(space-time).
..as you are a realist .. materialist.

 

[muhammad_isa]

The problem is what fixes our choices. Are we actually free to make a different choice? if the future is known, then the answer is no. We could only choose what we actually did choose.

..and this is where a lot of people go wrong..

Let me try another tack.. You say that "if the future is known" .. Known by whom .. known in what sense of the word??

But is there only one possible future? If so, then we don't actually have a real choice, only an illusion of such.

It might appear that way to you, but it is not so.
It is only because of our perception of time that you would think so.
For example, if I say the past is only one possible sequence of events, then that's OK .. our actions could have been chosen freely .. do you see what I'm getting at?

Responsibility is a legal fiction. it is useful for societies to order themselves.

..so you're an anarchist? AND a 'mod'?

 

[Polymath257]

..and this is where a lot of people go wrong..

Let me try another tack.. You say that "if the future is known" .. Known by whom .. known in what sense of the word??

Irrelevant. If it is possible to know, then there is only one possible future and *that* means that we do not determine our desires or, thereby, our choices.

It might appear that way to you, but it is not so.
It is only because of our perception of time that you would think so.

And how would it be different outside of time? if the spacetime manifold can be known, it is fixed. If it is fixed, then the specific choices we make are also fixed. Our desires are fixed. And that means that any choice we make *cannot* be free.

For example, if I say the past is only one possible sequence of events, then that's OK .. our actions could have been chosen freely .. do you see what I'm getting at?

But that directly contradicts knowledge of the past. It also contradicts your claim that there is only one possible future.

..so you're an anarchist? AND a 'mod'?

The forum is a human construct. We still make determinations of responsibility even if our determinations are fixed and not free. And members still get moderated even if they have no free choice in what they do.

No, I am not an anarchist. I don't ground responsibility in free will.

 

[Polymath257]

It really isn't .. but you don't believe that there is something other than this universe(space-time).
..as you are a realist .. materialist.

You say that as if it were a bad thing.

 

[muhammad_isa]

Irrelevant. If it is possible to know, then there is only one possible future..

What does it mean "to know" ?
To me, it means that I would know what I'm going to do tomorrow. (which I don't, of course).
..so as far as I'm concerned, the future is hidden from me.

..but what about another person .. what if they said that they knew what I was going to do tomorrow?
Much like a fortune-teller, for example.
Well, I wouldn't believe that they knew.

It seems to me, that your scenarios are manufactured by yourself, or maybe you can correct me.

..But that directly contradicts knowledge of the past. It also contradicts your claim that there is only one possible future..

I'm sorry .. I don't understand what you mean.

I'll try again .. the past is a series of events .. the future is a series of events.
The difference between them is that the past is not hidden from us .. and that's all !

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

It really isn't

That's not a rebuttal, but it is consistent with this:

"It's only Abrahamists that argue that a god can know the future perfectly yet mans will is not determined. It's an incoherent position - internally self-contradictory, but one he is forced to hold if he's to have an omniscient, just god that punishes for choices made (moral responsibility). They just keep insisting that these two are compatible."

You are the lone Abrahamist in this discussion, and the only one taking the position you take. As anticipated, you had no counterargument. You simply dissent and insist. You can't change the minds of critical thinkers like that. If you can't make a compelling argument, it is likely incorrect. And if you can't rebut my claim that that position is self-contradictory, it is probably correct. You ought to be able to do that if I am wrong and you are correct.

but you don't believe that there is something other than this universe(space-time).

I don't believe that there are gods, but I also don't say that that there are none.

And I also don't say that the universe is all of reality. I tend toward a multiverse that has always existed in which or from which island universes of every possible kind bud off or expands withing the substance of the multiverse, but that's speculation and intuition (a nagging hunch), not knowledge.

you are a realist .. materialist.

I'm an empiricist and a naturalist, meaning that for me, everything that exists is part of nature (more on that below), and knowledge about how our minds, our bodies, and the outside world work only comes from experience.

I also consider the concept of supernaturalism as described in Abrahamic religions incoherent. If a god or gods exist, it or they is or are also a part of nature, which is the collection of all objects and processes capable of interacting with one another. If a god can modify nature, it does so as a part of nature, which is also true for us.

And, continuing with incoherent concepts, if gods are conscious as in knowing everything or even anything, and if they act as in creating universes, then they experience the passage of time, making comments like "God exists outside of time" also self-contradictory. Only imagined things can be found nowhere at no time and cannot affect reality. That's the definition of nonexistent, and the opposite of existence.

You say that "if the future is known" .. Known by whom .. known in what sense of the word??

In the sense of being able to accurately describe the future before it occurs.

if I say the past is only one possible sequence of events, then that's OK .. our actions could have been chosen freely .. do you see what I'm getting at

You seem to be begging the question. You're assuming that those actions were freely chosen when the choices were made - that the choices could have been otherwise. Also, there's an asymmetry between past and future if free will exists that is absent if it doesn't. In the former case, there is only one past but uncountable possible futures, and though the futures of past moments are now locked in up until this moment, the future following this moment now and all future nows is yet to be written.

On the other hand, if the future is determined, the future is just as locked in as the past, and it will not be written, but rather, discovered as we see what's waiting around the bend. Only this latter scenario is consistent with omniscience. The universe need not contain an omniscient deity for it to be deterministic and have only one future possible, but if such a thing can exist and have that knowledge, then not only is the universe's future determined, there exists at least one mind that can do the math and predict what that future will be.

Think about an upcoming ball game, maybe the first game of the 2124 World Series. If somebody today can describe that game in detail including what teams will be playing and who will be on those teams a century from now, then you know two things for sure: The future is determined, and at least one person can forecast it.

Did you ever see a movie called Frequency? In it, Dennis Quaid's character's son has a ham radio that allows him to contact his father in the past. The son is speaking over the radio from the year 1998 to his father in the year 1969, who is in a bar watching game five of what is for him the as yet unfinished 1969 World Series. How does the convince his father of this? He spells out in detail what his father will soon see:

"Well, game five was the big one. It turned in the bottom of the 6th. We were down 3-0. Cleon Jones gets hit on the foot - left a scuffmark on the ball. Clendenon comes up. The count goes to 2 and 2. High fastball. He nailed it. Weis slammed a solo shot in the 7th to tie. Jones and Swoboda scored in the 8th. We won, Pop."

Then the father sees it all play out live on a TV in a bar. Is that convincing that his son had perfect knowledge of at least this aspect of his father's future? Once one rules out a taped delay broadcast of the game, yes, it is. Why? Because it is very specific and predicted something very unlikely. It's just not possible to do that without knowing how things will progress before they do.

But that's not omniscience. That's memory. A deity or other intelligence that could do that while in the bar would be closer to omniscient, and one that could do it a century before the ballplayers were even born or had names would even closer to omniscience, but in that world, the outcome of all games and all other events could be said to be predetermined, and that would be the case even if no mind or machine were up to the task of generating the predictions.

And to change the subject a bit because I've done the groundwork, that's what prophecy needs to look like to be convincing, and why biblical prophecy isn't convincing. It's too vague. If multiple future events can be said to fulfill it, then it's not high quality prophecy. Only one ballgame would fulfill that prophecy because of its specificity.

Biblical prophecy lacks that specificity, without which, it is very human and mundane, and reminds nobody of a god.

 

[Polymath257]

What does it mean "to know" ?
To me, it means that I would know what I'm going to do tomorrow. (which I don't, of course).
..so as far as I'm concerned, the future is hidden from me.

Yes, so? What does that have to do with whether your choices are free?

..but what about another person .. what if they said that they knew what I was going to do tomorrow?
Much like a fortune-teller, for example.
Well, I wouldn't believe that they knew.

Is that because you think it isn't possible to know the future? Or is it simply because you don't think that person is capable of knowing the future?

Once again, it is irrelevant what they *say*. If they *know* the future, then your decisions in the future cannot be other than they will be and that means those decisions are not free.

It seems to me, that your scenarios are manufactured by yourself, or maybe you can correct me.

Well, I am trying to get to the essential aspect of the word 'free' in 'free will'. And, as I understand it, that means that there is nothing prior to my choice that determines my choice. if it is *possible* to know what I will choose, though, then the choice could not be anything other than it will be, which means it is not free.

I'm sorry .. I don't understand what you mean.

I'll try again .. the past is a series of events .. the future is a series of events.
The difference between them is that the past is not hidden from us .. and that's all !

OK, let's ask it this way. Suppose that you consider a choice someone made in the past. Was that choice free? If there was only one possible future for that past decision, then it cannot have been free. So, the way things are NOW cannot have been fixed prior to that decision. There would have had to be more than one possible future at that point in the past.

We only know that decision because we are *one* on the possible futures of that past. Another possible future would have had a different decision, making the time *right now* not fixed.

 

[muhammad_isa]

You are the lone Abrahamist in this discussion, and the only one taking the position you take. As anticipated, you had no counterargument..

I have made a few posts in this thread about "my position"..
I make comments, when I deem it necessary.

..if you can't rebut my claim that that position is self-contradictory..

I can .. but you either don't understand or WON'T understand.

..there's an asymmetry between past and future if free will exists that is absent if it doesn't. In the former case, there is only one past but uncountable possible futures..

That is all theoretical .. there will only be ONE future from these "possible futures",
and we call it "the future"

Think about an upcoming ball game, maybe the first game of the 2124 World Series. If somebody today can describe that game in detail including what teams will be playing and who will be on those teams a century from now, then you know two things for sure: The future is determined, and at least one person can forecast it.

I know the future is determined .. whether any agent knows it, can know it or not !

It's all about perception .. the perception that the past is somehow very different to the future.
I thought that Einstein had already "put that to bed"

 

[muhammad_isa]

Well, I am trying to get to the essential aspect of the word 'free' in 'free will'. And, as I understand it, that means that there is nothing prior to my choice that determines my choice. if it is *possible* to know what I will choose, though, then the choice could not be anything other than it will be, which means it is not free..

Yep .. here we go again .. "prior to my choice".. the cart before the horse.
..and people mistakenly assume that if something is known "before" we do it, we are COMPELLED
to do it .. which is demonstrably false!

It is all about our perception of the passage of time, and the feeling it can't be violated.
There is no other LOGICAL reason for thinking that.

OK, let's ask it this way. Suppose that you consider a choice someone made in the past. Was that choice free? If there was only one possible future for that past decision, then it cannot have been free..

You talk about "possible futures" as if it is somehow meaningful.
It is only theoretical .. it cannot be realized in practice.

So, the way things are NOW cannot have been fixed prior to that decision. There would have had to be more than one possible future at that point in the past..

..and there always is .. but only ONE series of events will actually happen.

 

[Copernicus]

And the question is whether the choices made are already determined by the past. Is the agent *actually* free to select among possible alternatives or is it simply an illusion that they feel like they do? Even if they *want* the alternative, are they free to *want* something other? or is that desire also determined by past events?

Free will does not ordinarily mean freedom from causality. It means unimpeded willful control over possible actions. You need to consider what you actually mean when you say "*actually* free", because I think your emphatic qualifier says you perceive some ambiguity in what "free" can mean. Illusions are perceptual experiences that create a false picture of reality, but reality includes the uncertainty of future outcomes. Ignorance of the future is what forces us to make a choice in the first place, so the different options to achieve outcomes are real for the chooser. The agent does not control desires, but free will is not about choosing what the agent wants. The problem is about figuring out which option to select in order to achieve what the agent wants. Compatibilists assume determinism, so past events always determine current and future desires. Making a choice that fails to achieve a desired outcome becomes part of the causal chain that influences future choices. We learn from our mistakes.

Yes, we make choices based on perceived likelihood of possible futures. But, given that information, is the choice already determined? yes, we learn and change behaviors. But could we have chosen not to do those new behaviors or was the change determined by past events?

Everything is determined by past events. Free will is a fully determined process in that sense. But bear in mind that we are never given information about the future. The future is always unknown. Our very survival depends on the ability to choose options that we calculate will satisfy our desires.

Yes, *we* don't know what the future will be, but if it is determined that is irrelevant. If even our choices, even our desires, even the information available to us are ALL determined, then the choices, actions, etc are not *truly* free.

Free will is not about being free from causal determinacy. It is about surviving in a chaotic deterministic environment. You are simply misinterpreting what "free" means in "free will". It means what people ordinarily use it to mean--unimpeded choice. Our desires can compete with each other, but we always choose to satisfy the desire that wins the competition.

They would lack free will either way. They just have an illusion of free will when they don't know the future.

Wrong. You keep going back to the false assumption that freedom is freedom from causal determinacy. It is freedom from factors that impede our control. Accidents are not within the scope of free will, so we are not held responsible for everything that happens as a result of our choices. Nevertheless, accidents are also part of the deterministic environment. So the concept of control is central to the concept of free will. We are held responsible for consequences that were under our control to prevent, given the advantage of hindsight.

Yes, having a will is necessary. The freedom of that will is not. if the choices are fixed, if the desires are fixed, if everything is fixed, then there is no freedom in the choices.

But the future is not fixed in the mind of a human being. It is simply unknown. Choices in autonomous beings are always calculations based on the serendipitous conditions that the being encounters. We build complex machines that make rudimentary choices based on unpredictable situations they encounter, but we don't hold them responsible for their actions. Programmers even have a concept of nondeterministic programming to handle operation under uncertain (not fully predictable) conditions. Why do we not hold robots responsible for their choices? It's because they don't yet have our sophisticated ability to reflect on and learn from mistakes so that they can avoid them in the future. (Researchers in the field of AI keep trying to create robots that have something like free will, but we are a long way off from achieving that.)

Which simply means our perspective is illusory. We have limited perspective and miss the real picture where all of our choices are already fixed.

Our lack of omniscience does not make our perspective illusory. It requires us to make choices and be held accountable for those choices, because agents are embedded in the deterministic system, not outside observers of that system. We don't "miss the real picture". We simply don't have access to the omniscient perspective. Ironically, there are people who actually argue that we ought not to be held accountable for our choices because they think of free will as an illusion. In effect, we are off the hook for accountability because we aren't omniscient.

The key here is that word 'imagined'. That is why the freedom is illusory and not real.

The key word is 'control'. That is why the freedom is real and not illusory.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

I can [rebut your claim]

I don't think you can. For starters, if it could be rebutted, I'd be one of the ones doing it. All you've done is dissent. You disagree, but don't explain why you think you're right and I'm wrong. On the other hand, I've done just that. I've explained how you're wrong and also why you hold that wrong idea. You have to. You've chosen to believe something incoherent, and are prepared to defend that choice, but without ammunition (without sound argument), just protest.

mistakenly assume that if something is known "before" we do it, we are COMPELLED to do it

So you keep saying but can't support the claim. It's you that is mistaken.

What does compelled mean to you? In the physical sense, it means that there can be only one outcome. The earth is compelled to continue orbiting the earth for as long as that is possible. Unless a means to prevent death comes along, we are compelled to die one day. There are no choices, and accurate forecasts can be made.

There's a softer sense for the word compelled, such as being compelled to obey the law. This is a different meaning. You aren't actually compelled to obey the law in the sense of orbiting and dying, and many won't. We don't want to conflate these two meanings, one meaning having no choice and the other meaning to choose between compliance with the law and flouting it.

And that's what we're discussing on this thread - whether the scofflaw really had an unforced choice (free will) or if his fate was predetermined (the illusion of free will in a deterministic world).

there will only be ONE future from these "possible futures", and we call it "the future." only ONE series of events will actually happen.

That would be the case in both a world with free will and one without it, so it's not helpful in deciding the matter.

I know the future is determined

If it were, free will doesn't exist, which is not your position.

And nobody knows the answer to that question. How could they short of actually correctly predicting the future?

 

[Copernicus]

Supposed "ordinary usage of English language: does not defend Dennett's position. I presented my view of Limited Dree Will in plain simple language, and you were unable to understand or acknowledge it. The references provided do support my view regardless.

Dennett himself appeals to ordinary usage to defend his position, and I agree with him. I have searched for your "plain simple language" explanation and been unable to find it. Subsequent attempts to get you to clarify have been frustrating, as you usually just tell me to go reread what you have written. I accept that you will not, or cannot, clarify the concept in a way that makes sense to me.

This limitation on your part does not negate that the reference goes into considerable detail concerning the recent history since Libet up through the present research of the actual support for my view of a "Limited Free Will."

I don't see how, but I accept that you think it does. I have no problem with Libet's controversial experiments. I only note that Libet himself never touted it as an argument against free will.

Nonetheless of the typo, the reference does support what I call I call "Limited Free Will, Not being enamored with 4.1 doe not negate that there is support for a "Limited Free Will," It is clear and specific.

"Limited Free Will" is not a term used in that article or any other published source that I am aware of. Without more effort on your part to clarify the concept, I have no idea whether the reference supports your concept or not.

The claim of "Living in the moment" does not negated the fact that out choices are limited by many deterministic factors such as the influence of the chain of cause and effect choices in the past, culture, religion and other documented factors.

Nobody is claiming otherwise. The debate is truly over what the expression free will means, not whether we live in a deterministic environment.

I do not support the view that our Free Will is an illusion it too subjective. I go by the research cited to justify the concept of "Potential Limited Free Will."

Despite the fact that the research cited does not mention your concept of "Potential Limited Free Will", and you fail to clarify its meaning.

I do not remotely defend Libertarian Free Will, which is too close to Dennett's belief to be real. Both are not acceptable based on the research and evidence for "Limited Free Will." Libertarian Free Will" does not acknowledge the documented factors of Determinism that limits our Free Will choices. Even though the references use some more advanced language the conclusions are clear and specific.

I have already stipulated that you don't defend libertarian free will, so you don't need to tell me that you don't support it. What you get wrong here is that Dennett supports it, but you can research why Dennett disagrees with it, if that interests you. Libertarian free will is a distraction here.

Your negating and dismissing my references that support my view of a "Limited Free Will," including the list of documented factors that do limit our Free Will. See reference in next post.

I do not negate or dismiss your references. I simply don't see how you connect them to your concept of "limited free will", which is not a term used in them. Nobody disputes that there are limitations of all sorts on our choices. The question is how that relates to the philosophical positions under discussion.

The following debate between Dennett and Caruso is veery revealing. I actually do not agree with either extreme view, but like Caruso's description of Moral Responsibility. As stated before I do not believe Moral Responsibility is a factor as to whether we have Free will or not. Again Moral Responsibility is an evolved necessary factor of humans for the survival of the species, and not related to the question of whether we have Free Will or not. It is only recently that deterministic factors have been considered in questions of Justice for Moral Responsibility. The fact that there are documented many deterministic factors that limits our Moral Responsibility further negates the view of Libertarian Free Will and Dennett's belief.

On free will: Daniel Dennett and Gregg Caruso go head to head | Aeon Essays

Can we be held morally responsible for our actions? Yes, says Daniel Dennett. No, says Gregg Caruso. Reader, you decide

aeon.co

Caruso: I don’t doubt that the sense of ‘desert’ you defend is the everyday sense. Keep in mind, though, that it is exactly this sense of desert that is used to justify retributivism. And nothing you have said suggests that you reject either of the two main tenets of retributivism – its backward-looking-ness (at least internal to the moral responsibility system) and its appeal to just deserts. Quite the opposite, you explicitly state that the premeditated murderer really does ‘deserve to go to prison for a very long time’, irrespective of future consequences in specific instances. I’m confused, then, why you continue to deny that you are a retributivist. It seems to me that your view is indistinguishable from retributivism. Yes, you support sentence reform and eliminating the death penalty, but that’s doesn’t make you a non-retributivist. But rather than get into a debate over your membership in the Retributivist Party, I think it would be more helpful to focus on specifics.

We can ignore Libertarian Free Will, which is not consistent with Dennett's compatibilism. That is a nice article, but you only cite a paragraph from Caruso that is embedded in the discussion and which Dennett goes on to answer. You and I probably come to very different conclusions about who wins that debate.

I think that Dennett's repeated references to an agent's control is fundamental to his concept of free will based on everyday language. People weigh a lot of different factors when they make choices. The sense of free in the expression free will is the sense of free or unimpeded control, not freedom from causal determinacy. Agents don't have control over a lot of things, but they do have control over what they can make their bodies do. That is fundamental to human experience. Compatibilists do not deny that human agents are free of determinism, only that they have freedom of movement within the context of a deterministic environment--what Dennett once called "elbow room" in a book title. Robots also have limited freedom in that sense, and they are obviously making fully determined choices. Nevertheless, they are free to exercise different options on the basis of programmed calculations. Humans are just more complex "moist robots".

 

[muhammad_isa]

So you keep saying but can't support the claim. It's you that is mistaken..

Ha ha.
It's that sort of topic, where people are convinced that they are right.

What does compelled mean to you?

It means that you HAVE no choice .. you MUST do it.

And that's what we're discussing on this thread - whether the scofflaw really had an unforced choice (free will) or if his fate was predetermined (the illusion of free will in a deterministic world).

The word "predetermined" is a loaded word. It means different things to different people.
It's that "pre" .. meaning before .. and yet again, we are back to the common, human perception
of time. i.e. it passes from past to future and is immutable, in as much as it can't be violated

Your viewpoint, bearing the above in mind, is that if an action is known "BEFORE" you act,
then your action is beyond your control, as you "MUST" do it .. right?

No .. wrong!
Why is it not possible that you WANT to make that choice, and you will only make that choice because you WANT to??

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

It's that sort of topic, where people are convinced that they are right.

That doesn't matter. Their arguments do. Yes, you are convinced that you are right and I am wrong, but can't reasons why you think that. I, on the other hand can explain why each of us believes what he does. We use radically different methods for deciding what's true. Your beliefsmeet your faith-based belief criteria, which is nothing more than the will to believe and which I reject, and my beliefs pass my critical thought criteria, which you reject.

[Compelled] means that you HAVE no choice .. you MUST do it.

That's correct. You wrote, "mistakenly assume that if something is known "before" we do it, we are COMPELLED to do it." If I believe I know what you will choose and not as a prediction of what is likely based on your prior behavior but as the result of some deduction, and I am always right, then you were compelled to make those choices even if you didn't realize it and it didn't feel like it. If on the other hand free will exists, then you are not compelled to make the choice I predicted.

Your viewpoint, bearing the above in mind, is that if an action is known "BEFORE" you act, then your action is beyond your control, as you "MUST" do it .. right?

Yes.

No .. wrong! Why is it not possible that you WANT to make that choice, and you will only make that choice because you WANT to??

It is possible, but it is also possible that you were compelled to want what you wanted. The difference is that in one case, unfailingly accurate prediction is possible in principle even if not in practice, and the other, you just might fool the predictor by choosing otherwise.

Sorry, but it is you who is incorrect here, although you can't see so through a faith-based confirmation bias, which supports your faith-based beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence and reason. There is zero chance for you accept my position however correct it may be. You have no sound argument, just faith-based beliefs. Each of us has erected a barrier to knowing or believing using the other's method. Critical thought prevents accumulating insufficiently evidenced and reasoned beliefs, and a confirmation bias prevents critical thought.

As I said earlier, I understand that. You've embraced an incoherent doctrine which is sacred to you and means more to you than being rational or correct, and so you make the kinds of comments you have without regard for their lack of coherence and aren't interested in whether than might be the case. Your opinions will never change. Mine might, but it's unlikely.

Here's why we're different in that regard. As you may know, he moderator in the debate between Ken Ham and Bill Nye on whether creationism is a viable scientific pursuit asked, “What would change your minds?” Scientist Bill Nye answered, “Evidence.” Young Earth Creationist Ken Ham answered, “Nothing. I'm a Christian.” Elsewhere, Ham stated, “By definition, no apparent, perceived or claimed evidence in any field, including history and chronology, can be valid if it contradicts the scriptural record."

I'm Nye in this and you're Ham. Nothing can change your mind, whereas I'm amenable to evidence. If I'm wrong and that can be demonstrate convincingly, my mind will change. If you filter out the evidence a priori, then it can't have any effect on you.

 

[muhammad_isa]

It is possible, but it is also possible that you were compelled to want what you wanted..

Exactly !
..so I am right, that the fact that a prediction happens to be true, does NOT automatically mean
that you did not make the choice freely, and were compelled to choose it.

Sorry, but it is you who is incorrect here, although you can't see so through a faith-based confirmation bias..

Our conversation thus far, has not touched on any religious aspect, although it is YOU who keep
bringing it up.

You have no sound argument, just faith-based beliefs.

You what??
You have just agreed that it is possible for a person to have WANTED to make the choice, and yet you still tell me that they were compelled.
Oh boy!

Each of us has erected a barrier to knowing or believing using the other's method.

I have not created any barrier .. I approach this topic scientifically.
Well .. we are in the science and religion forum.

Nothing can change your mind, whereas I'm amenable to evidence. If I'm wrong and that can be demonstrate convincingly, my mind will change..

OK .. over to you, sir.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

so I am right, that the fact that a prediction happens to be true, does NOT automatically mean that you did not make the choice freely, and were compelled to choose it.

I've never argued otherwise.

I don't think you understand my argument. Making a correct prediction about a person's choice doesn't tell us whether that choice could have been otherwise or not just as correctly predicting the outcome of a coin flip doesn't help us distinguish between a coin that could have landed heads or tails or is loaded to always come up the same deterministically predictable way.

Now, if somebody does that consistently for all choosers and their every choice, he has convincingly demonstrated that free will does not exist just as if he correctly calls every coin flip every time for a given coin he has demonstrated that the coin had no "choice" but to fall as he predicted.

Our conversation thus far, has not touched on any religious aspect

I've argued that you are defending incoherent religious doctrine that you accept on faith, and also that I never see your position advocated by anybody but people of Abrahamic faiths. That you haven't addressed any of that does not mean that this conversation has not touched on any religious subject.

You have just agreed that it is possible for a person to have WANTED to make the choice, and yet you still tell me that they were compelled.

No, that's not what I told you. It has to do with whether the wanting is freely chosen by the wanter, not the action following the wanting. The issue of whether the wanting is free or compelled by deterministic, subconscious, neural mechanisms is the issue of whether that will is free decide what to want or if it is determined. We're asking if the wanter is compelled to want what it wants. If it is, then will is not free.

Sometimes, we get conflicting messages. A man is trying to quit smoking. One part of his brain tells him to go get a cigarette, and another says not to. Even this may be and likely is all playing out according to the laws of physics as the axons of neurons depolarize as ion flow and send neurotransmitters across synapses. The center of consciousness, the self, is likely a passive observer of this tug of war, which is sometimes won by urges and sometimes won by the reasoning mind. This too may all be deterministic, and the outcome foreordained even if not presently perfectly predictable. That would be describing a situation where both the wanting and the action taken are not chosen at all much less freely.

I have not created any barrier .. I approach this topic scientifically.

I'm sure you believe that, but I don't.

 

[muhammad_isa]

I've never argued otherwise..

I won't argue with you..

I don't think you understand my argument. Making a correct prediction about a person's choice doesn't tell us whether that choice could have been otherwise or not just as correctly predicting the outcome of a coin flip doesn't help us distinguish between a coin that could have landed heads or tails or is loaded to always come up the same deterministically predictable way.

That, to me, seems to be a distraction from what I was discussing.

i.e. I was told "The problem is what fixes our choices. Are we actually free to make a different choice? if the future is known, then the answer is no."

..and I said that is wrong, and you said it wasn't.

Now, if somebody does that consistently for all choosers and their every choice, he has convincingly demonstrated that free will does not exist..

Not at all .. you are doing it again.
All that has been demonstrated, in your "experiment", is that the predictor can be right all the time.
Nothing to do with free-will at all.

Now, you might wonder how the predictor knows .. but that is another issue, to that which I was
discussing.

I've argued that you are defending incoherent religious doctrine that you accept on faith, and also that I never see your position advocated by anybody but people of Abrahamic faiths. That you haven't addressed any of that does not mean that this conversation has not touched on any religious subject.

I am not interested in addressing that, until you understand the scientific, logical basics.

No, that's not what I told you. It has to do with whether the wanting is freely chosen by the wanter, not the action following the wanting..

What???
You wish to complicate the issue by bringing up whether a person wants to want?

We're asking if the wanter is compelled to want what it wants. If it is, then will is not free.

I think perhaps you have spelled it wrong .. should it not be a "k" rather than a "t"?

Sometimes, we get conflicting messages. A man is trying to quit smoking. One part of his brain tells him to go get a cigarette, and another says not to.

Yeah, yeah .. you are talking about a different subject.
i.e. psychological disturbances that a person might be affected by

Even this may be and likely is all playing out according to the laws of physics as the axons of neurons depolarize as ion flow and send neurotransmitters across synapses.

..and now you are talking about physical problems in the brain

In fact, anything but the crux of the matter .. that we do INDEED have the capacity to
make choices of our own free-wil .. and that the law in practically every country in the world recognizes that fact.

You can go on about it being an illusion and what-not .. but there is no real scientific basis
for such an opinion. It is airy-fairy , quite contrary.

..and you complain about believers in G-d? Hmmph!