Evidence

[Enai de a lukal]

It looks like your interlocuter here is slightly out of his depth with respect to these arguments, LegionOnomaMoi, which apparently has given you the (mistaken) impression that you have a leg to stand on.

I'm more than willing to show you your error.

 

[Thief]

Ok....I see you're new here....
Let's see what you've got.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

New to this particular forum only- not new to the subject matter.

And first we need to clarify which version of the ontological argument is in discussion here- even with the Modal Ontological Argument, there are several versions (Godel's, Plantinga's, Hartshorne's, etc.) which are slightly different.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

God was under no logical compunction to create the world (or us) and so it certainly can’t be said that he had to create a world containing evil, or that he was compelled to inflict suffering, for there is no logical absurdity in conceiving a world without those things.

There certainly isn’t a logical absurdity in conceiving a world without evil and suffering. Christians call such a world “heaven”. Second, in order for you to disprove of God creating a world with evil, you are saying that evil is wrong. Where do you get this sense of right and wrong from? You admit that evil is in this world, which is saying “since evil exists, this isn’t the way that it should be. Something is wrong here”. Well, where are you getting this notion from, if not from your own presupposed moral code?

A typical response to this might be: ‘There would be no point in God creating a world of automatons’, who always did exactly as programmed, and so he created a world of free agents with the power to make choices’. There are two things wrong with that. It assumes that evil must be available as a possible choice - an exquisite example of begging the question, since evil exists only because it is God’s will, and if he didn’t will it then it wouldn’t exist!

Evil is a possible choice if there is a thing called “free will”. What does it mean to commit an evil act? It means that an act was committed that should not have been committed. If someone doesn’t have the ability to freely choose which act to commit, then that person doesn’t have free will. God cannot “make” someone “freely” chose to do something. Evil acts are committed by those that freely choose to commit them.

since evil exists only because it is God’s will, and if he didn’t will it then it wouldn’t exist!

I wouldn’t take it that far. Evil is the result of a choice that is made. Now, God created humans with free will to do right or wrong, but what he cant do is guarantee that everyone will make the right choice. Evil is the result of people making wrong choices and it is not God’s fault that humans take their free will and abuse it by making wrong choices.

Think about it this way; since the dawn of mankind, if no one EVER committed an evil act, then there would be NO EVIL now would there? So if you blame God for “creating evil”, all you are saying is “I blame God for giving man the ability to commit evil acts”. Well, it was necessary for God to give man the ability to commit evil acts, because guess what……………there cant be free will without man being able to make the right choice or the wrong choice.

The other point is that we can make all sorts of choices without having to inflict pain and suffering on our fellow men, and nor do we need evil as a perverse form of adversity test. We can conceive of a world devoid of evil, where the inhabitants co-exist in a harmonious way. And doesn’t that fit the notion of heaven, as believed or envisioned by many theists?

Absolutely. But it is my personal opinion that we can’t fully appreciate the joys of heaven if we didn’t experience the pain and suffering on earth. 50 Cent said it best in his rap song “Many Men”. He said..

“Sunny days wouldn’t be special, if it wasn’t for rain”
“Joy wouldn’t feel so good, if it wasn’t for pain”

It is the simple demonstration to show the contradiction that evil exists in the face of an all loving, benevolent God.

Well, he had two options. Either he could create human robots that would be “programmed” to do what he wanted them to do. Or, he could create humans with the ability to think and reason, capable of freely making the right and wrong choices on their on. It is only the latter choice that would result in evil acts by people, because God can’t guarantee that his people will make the right choices, given there free will.

I myself don’t want to be murdered and I don’t want my kith and kin to be murdered.

Neither do I and neither does God.

2 + 2 = 4 is a necessary truth and we cannot know it or understand it to be anything but true; but if, as you say, “we don’t know whether God exists” then “God exists” cannot be on a level with 2 + 2 = 4, a demonstrable necessary truth that we don’t discover by beginning from the notion of possibility, and a chain of reasoning, but is presented intuitively and indisputably as absolute and certain.

That still doesn’t change the fact that all possible necessary truths must in fact be necessarily truth. Either it is possible for God to exist as a necessary truth, or impossible. If it is possible, it must be true. The question is, which one is it?? I think the concept of God is logically coherent and unless someone can show otherwise, I don’t see any good reason why admitting that such a being’s existence is possible is so difficult, unless one is denying this because they are aware of the implications.

Second, as far as intuitiveness, I think it is on the same level based on the possibility of an actual infinity. Once it is demonstrated that an infinite chain of events is impossible, it becomes apparent that there had to be one uncaused cause. This is intuitive and it is based on the law of excluded middle.

No, I'm not - but then neither is God, since there is no demonstrable omniscient being.

So because you aren’t, God isn’t? Gotcha lol.

You said;: “It is necessary that the cause of time exist as a atemporal being. But it isn’t necessary that the cause of time REMAINED an atemporal being.”
And in that case God is conditioned (contradiction!)

And why is it a problem for God being conditioned in this sense?

Firstly, you appear to believe that since the world is contingent it must answer to a necessary being

No, since the world is contingent it must OWE ITS EXISTENCE to a necessary being.

but that is not so, for there is no logically necessary connection between the two objects.

I would agree, and that’s why I don’t hold the view that since the world is contingent it must answer to a necessary being.

Secondly, your last sentence should read: ‘All things are necessary or contingent’. And I do not accept for a moment that from the concept of necessity, which stands in relation to contingent matter, that there is a necessary being that necessarily exists, which is precisely what the Argument from Contingency tries to address, and can only do so by calling upon features found in the contingent world, which leads to a contradiction.

Um, cot. Anything that you can think of in the natural universe, anything and everything…every material physical object in the material world owes its existence to something else. Nothing is the origin of its own domain. That is the nature of contingency. Necessity is the exact opposite, and you will be very hard pressed to find any kind of entity, whether material or otherwise that doesn’t fall under those two categories.

And yet you happily adopt contingent features in order to plea to God!

What contingent features?

Yes, plain and simple - but misleading! I’m not disputing the concept that an object that is contingent upon no other object is necessary; the statement is analytic and therefore true because it cannot be false. But what I’m saying to you is that from an object that is said have to necessary existence it does not follow that the object necessarily exists. Can you not see the distinction?

I don’t see the distinction.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

All of this is moot. Arguments for the existence of God are, without exception, unsound and either invalid or question-begging.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

All of this is moot. Arguments for the existence of God are, without exception, unsound and either invalid or question-begging.

Yep, spot on.

:beach:

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

A contradiction obtains because the concept of moral perfection stands in opposition to the causing of pain and suffering.

Give me an example because there are quite a few ways to take this.

The term ‘discipline’ means training or conditions to enable improvement; it isn’t synonymous with the infliction of pain and suffering, and nor is it necessary for an omnipotent being to resort to such means. But then God does say “I create evil” (Isaiah 45:7)

So spanking a child along with prison and jail systems is wrong? Second…what is evil? Evil is the opposite of holiness. But in order to be evil or commit evil acts, you have to choose to do so, right? In order to freely choose to do so, you have to be given both options, right?

The real existence of an object cannot be demonstrated via a proposition (which of course is why nobody believes in God because of the ontological argument)

Well, it works for me.

; all that can be done is to show that the conclusion follows from valid premises and in which case the conclusion is said to be sound. So the soundness is arrived at due to the validity of the premises and not to any factual or ontological certitude; therefore one can’t suppose the existence of a necessarily existent being by virtue of the terms and their relationship in a sentence.

So lets break it down then. Do you believe that for something to be necessarily true, it must exist in all possible worlds? Yes or No. We will take it step by step.

But in any case what actually governs logical expressions is the question of whether we can think what cannot be thought. And whatever can be conceived of as existent can also be conceived to be non-existent, and since the God concept can only exist in the mind when it’s thought of, there is therefore no God that can be thought as remaining always in existence.
I believe the foregoing to be entirely conclusive in rebutting arguments of the kind that assert the existence of any being by non-inferential means.

Well, this wont work for the simply fact that you may very well conceive of God not existing, but if God does actually exist as a necessary being, then how you conceive him doesn’t really mean anything. I can conceive of a universe full of mermaids, but whether or not a universe full of mermaids exists is independent of what I think of them. That is one of the reasons why Anslems version is rejected. This is not “thinking” something in to existence. This is a matter of examining the logical coherency of certain possibilities.

For me the world just is

Well answer me this; If you lived in the 3rd century and while hiking you stumbled across a space shuttle, would you believe that the space shuttle “just is”..or would you believe there is a reason for the space shuttle’s existence, which requires an external cause?

and I have to accept that no empirical knowledge or metaphysical speculation can answer me why it is. But what I do know is that every argument to other worlds (God) is grounded firmly in this world, even the non-inferential ones. So the actual world is both prior to and necessary for all other-worldly notions, and this means we can only argue backwards to them. And this, it seems to me, undermines any argument to a supposed supreme being since it cannot logically exist without this, the actual world.

How do you get the ability to think and learn from an entity that lacks the ability to think or learn?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Well, it works for me.

An invalid argument "works for you"?

This is a pretty damning admission.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

So I'm sick of trying to trace the thread of this discussion through 30+ pages to find the post(s) that began it- but I've gathered here that someone (potentially more than one someones), presumably Call of the Wild at the very least, is endorsing at least one (if not more) argument of natural theology- the causal/motion argument, the ontological argument, perhaps one or more others?

In any case, I've attempted to get the attention of these posters so we could get clear, first, what they are claiming- which argument they are endorsing- so that we can discuss the folly of such futile reasoning.

To do this, though, somebody has to step up to the plate and say which argument(s) we're talking about here.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Well, let's try this.

The Modal Ontological Argument

The argument is essentially that A. it is possible there a maximally great being exists and B. that necessarily, if a maximally great being exists it exists necessarily. From here one infers that it is possible that such a being exists, therefore it is possibly necessary that such a being exists, and from this, one concludes that such a being does in fact exist. But to make the argument, and the inferences, explicit lets present them in numbered premise/conclusion form-

P1. It is necessary that, if a maximally great being exists then it is necessary that a maximally great being exists.
P2.It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
C3: If it is necessary that, if a maximally great being exists then it is necessary that a maximally great being exists, then if it is possible that a maximally great being exists then it is possibly necessary that a maximally great being exists. (from P2, 3)
P4. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists then it is possibly necessary that a maximally great being exists.
C5. It is possibly necessary that a maximally great being exists. (from P2, 4, C3)
P6. If it is possibly necessary that a maximally great being exits, then a maximally great being exists. (B-principle)
C7: A maximally great being exists.

Now, is the argument sound? It’s hard to say, because it isn’t obvious at first glance whether the argument is even valid; there are some rather large problems with both P1 and P2, and the inference at P6 is based on a modal principle that is not included in all systems of modal logic. Furthermore, as we will see, in order to get the modal principle that allows the inference to P6, the proponent of the MOA must open the door to a proliferation of entities and ultimately, potential contradiction.

Standard criticisms of this argument focus on P1 (for instance, any Buddhist or Hindu would likely claim that existence is not greater than not-existence, and necessary existence is not greater than actual or contingent existence, while others would question if the notion of a "necessary being" is any more coherent than that of a "neurotic triangle" or a "valid being" ) or P2 (pointing out contradictions in the definition for God, i.e. the logical problem of evil, logical conflict between maxima of various attributes, etc.), which are all valid criticisms, but I will take a slightly different route here.

The serious, and fatal, problem appears at P6, i.e. the inference from the possible necessity of a maximally great being to there (actually) existing such a being: this inference is an instance of the general modal principle "◇□P-> P" (if it is possibly necessary that P, then P) sometimes called the “B-principle”, which is found in certain modal systems, but not all. Without this principle, the inference can not be made to “a maximally great being exists”, and the MOA is invalid; therefore the MOA is valid ONLY in those systems of modal logic which include this principle, and invalid in those that do not (Von Wright’s system M, any of the Lewis systems weaker than S5).

Ultimately though, whether we adopt a modal system which has the B-principle or not has devastating consequences for the MOA either way; if we don’t adopt such a system, P6 doesn’t stand and the argument can’t go through, but if we do adopt such a system, this leads to a proliferation of existant necessary beings, and some contradictions with the theological conception that God exists. If the MOA is valid, and the B-principle states an acceptable inference (i.e. from “it is possibly necessary that X exists” to “x exists&#8221, then it provides us with the logical machinery to demonstrate the existence of all sorts of necessary beings- for instance, any number of beings whose essence entails existence but who are not maximally great- maybe they are simply very great but not maximally so.

Consider a being whose existence is necessary if it is possible (like God’s), but who is slightly less maximally great- is it possible that such a great-but-less-than-maximally-great necessary being exists? If it is, and the MOA is valid, then it follows that such a being in fact exists. Moreover, we could now prove the actual existence of any number of such entities we care to pick; thus our ontology has gotten a lot more crowded, and arbitrarily so it would seem. Worse, if the MOA is valid and we can derive the existence of a maximally great being, as well as a variety of great-but-not-maximally-great necessary beings, then we would presumably have placed a limit on God’s omnipotence- God could not cause these other necessary beings to cease to exist, since they exist of their own necessity- moreover, this would presumably contradict the frequent claim in theology that God is the first uncaused cause in the sense that he alone is not dependent upon anything else for his existence. The existence of other necessary beings would mean there are at least some things which do not depend on God for their existence.

So, we’ve seen that the premises of the MOA are highly questionable, but more importantly that it is invalid unless the crucial inference is granted; but if this inference is indeed granted, it leads to an arbitrary proliferation of entities in our ontology, and suggests that any maximally great being could not have the qualities typically ascribed to the Christian God and may even be self-contradictory. In other words, it fails either way.

****

That should get us started...

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Depending on which version of the ontological argument you're endorsing, no, it is not necessarily valid.

I wasn't using any ontological argument. I was using classical logic. The argument I made was absolutely valid. And as long as the premise is accepted, it's sound too. Of course, it would be ridiculous to accept the premise, but that was my point. If your argument is valid, all that means (in logic) is that the conclusion follows from the premise(s). That's why the following is yet another valid argument:

1) Computers run on gasoline | P
2) If computers run on gasoline, then there is no god |A
Conclusion: there is no god | MP by 1 & 2

That is absolutely valid. It is not sound, because computers don't run on gasoline. However, my point was (again) to illustrate one of the many problems with the proof given.

In any case, it is either invalid or it is question-begging, regardless of whatever version you use- and none of them are sound.

There are absolutely arguments for god that are sound. However, they always (IMO) require one to accept at least one premise that need not be accepted.

This is all moot. It looks like you're trying to endorse some version of the Modal Ontological argument

Then you should look more carefully. First, I'm agnostic. Second, I have not here or anywhere endorsed any proof of god. Third, I've been actively arguing against a particularly poorly constructed attempt at the ontological argument.


-

which has several highly questionable premises, as well as requiring a dubious modal principle for the crucial inference; without this "B-principle" the Modal Ontological Argument is invalid, but if it is granted, it leads to an arbitrary proliferation of entities and ultimately, an apparent contradiction.

You refer to "the" modal ontological argument. Which one? Even when dealing with the same logician, we aren't necessarily dealing with the same argument. Also, I just realized something else. You mention "B-principle". Brouwer's system was at best as "powerful" as S5, but you include only one principle, and I'm assuming it's the so-called "Brouwerian axiom", it's weaker than S5 and different enough from S4 (not just because neither one contains the other) that it is akin to both M and T (and in fact is just the axiom added to T). The only problem I have with it is how it is incorporated into a possible worlds logic.

 

[Willamena]

So I'm sick of trying to trace the thread of this discussion through 30+ pages to find the post(s) that began it- but I've gathered here that someone (potentially more than one someones), presumably Call of the Wild at the very least, is endorsing at least one (if not more) argument of natural theology- the causal/motion argument, the ontological argument, perhaps one or more others?

In any case, I've attempted to get the attention of these posters so we could get clear, first, what they are claiming- which argument they are endorsing- so that we can discuss the folly of such futile reasoning.

To do this, though, somebody has to step up to the plate and say which argument(s) we're talking about here.

Precisely one or more, yes.

Call of the Wild has his own take on the argument, which he debated in this thread:

http://www.religiousforums.com/foru...4833-ontological-argument-gods-existence.html

 

[Enai de a lukal]

I wasn't using any ontological argument. I was using classical logic.

That's fine- as I thought was obvious, I was trying to get clear on who exactly is endorsing what in this thread; the thread is over 30 pages long and I have neither the time nor the desire to read through all of it.

There are absolutely arguments for god that are sound. However, they always (IMO) require one to accept at least one premise that need not be accepted.

And why would such a premise not need to be accepted? If it is because the premise is not true, then the argument is unsound. But if the premise is true, then it probably needs to be accepted, yes?

As I said, there are no sound arguments for the existence of God. If you disagree, give an example.

Then you should look more carefully. First, I'm agnostic. Second, I have not here or anywhere endorsed any proof of god. Third, I've been actively arguing against a particularly poorly constructed attempt at the ontological argument.

Then my posts are not addressed to you.

You refer to "the" modal ontological argument. Which one?

Well, that's part of what I'm trying to get clear on. It looks like Plantinga's version, but this is just what I'm guessing from the little I've seen here.

 

[Thief]

All of this is moot. Arguments for the existence of God are, without exception, unsound and either invalid or question-begging.

How about choosing the difference between an act of creation....
and believing the universe can be self-starting?

Which came first?...Spirit?....or substance?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

How about choosing the difference between an act of creation....
and believing the universe can be self-starting?

On what basis does one choose? And how have we already decided that there needs to be an act of creation or "self-starting" at all? Are we just ruling out the infinite regress out of hand?

Which came first?...Spirit?....or substance?

Incoherent question.

 

[sonofdad]

How about choosing the difference between an act of creation....
and believing the universe can be self-starting?

If it is conceivable that God is "self starting" then it is at least as conceivable the universe is "self starting".

 

[Thief]

On what basis does one choose? And how have we already decided that there needs to be an act of creation or "self-starting" at all? Are we just ruling out the infinite regress out of hand?

Incoherent question.

At the 'point' of singularity.....it's one or the other.
Spirit First?.....or substance.

 

[Thief]

If it is conceivable that God is "self starting" then it is at least as conceivable the universe is "self starting".

According to the science I was taught...the following is firm.....
There is no effect without a cause.
No cause without an effect.
Science experiments rely on this as results must repeat...firmly so.

Also....
An object at rest will remain at rest until....Something....moves it.

I say the movement of the universe (one word)....is the proof of God.

 

[sonofdad]

According to the science I was taught...the following is firm.....
There is no effect without a cause.
No cause without an effect.
Science experiments rely on this as results must repeat...firmly so.

Also....
An object at rest will remain at rest until....Something....moves it.

I say the movement of the universe (one word)....is the proof of God.

If everything needs a cause, doesn't God need a cause as well?

 

[Thief]

If everything needs a cause, doesn't God need a cause as well?

And so the one outstanding item we cannot experiment with.....
The ability to say...'I AM'

How to do so with no affirmation?

How about ....'Let there be light!'