I consider framing questions and possibilities in black and white terms, as you have here, to nicely define "extreme".
Unfortunately, this clearly doesn't apply to propositions, which are either true or false. This is not extreme, this is
the principle of bivalence, which I would argue,
always applies to well-formed propositions in natural language.
This is what I see as the OP is getting at, and I agree. This is extreme.
Then try to defend that claim, because so far, the OP's argument for it has completely fallen to pieces.
What about having partial truth? What about shades of grey?
A nice slogan, but what does that actually mean in this case? What would it mean for minimal theism (the claim that at least one god exists), to be "partially true"? How can "God exists" be partially true- which part?
What about different perspectives on the question of what theism says or suggests, or about what atheism says or suggests?
What about it?
Your conclusions that theism = incoherent = false, is a radical leap to Answers with a capital A (absolutist thought), which implicitly suggests you have exhausted ALL possible perspectives on this and can conclude therefore it is false.
Again, this is a nice slogan, but it doesn't really hold up under close scrutiny: provided that theism is
incoherent (which I have not argued explicitly here, having argued it at some length on any number of other threads, and can elaborate on as necessary), that it is false is not a "radical leap" at all. If a view is internally inconsistent, it cannot be true,
even in principle.
And this "exhausting all possible perspectives" is a
red herring: there are certain elements all forms of theism must have in common, in order to qualify as theism in the first place- the existence of god, for one. I argue that
transcendence and
agency are the
sine qua non of theistic gods generally, and thus is a
distinctive,
necessary feature of theism
as such. However, if
a causal agent which transcends all conditions and relations is incoherent, as it most surely is (since causal agency entails being subject to conditions and relations), then we needn't consider each individual type of theism- the necessary, distinguishing feature of theism as such is incoherent. Considering particular forms of theism would be
redundant.
I never got back to my response to you in the other thread about fundamentalist views applied to atheism, but I think saying weak atheism isn't true atheism pretty much suggests that.
Not really. I've argued elsewhere why I find the weak vs. strong, implicit vs. explicit atheism distinctions extremely poor. Atheism, as the word has generally figured in the relevant discourse, pertains to the position that theism is false, which is a reasoned, cognitive, positive position. "Weak" or "implicit" atheism is not, and it includes all forms of non-theism including agnosticism. Thus, it is an unnecessarily confusing way of categorizing these views, that runs contrary to established linguistic usage. That said, I don't want this to turn into YET ANOTHER thread arguing semantics over how to define "atheism", "non-theism", etc, although it appears it has already sort of devolved into that.