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Lack of free will & morality

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
Does a lack of belief in free will undercut a belief in objective morality, in objective "should's" and "should not's?"

My thoughts are as follows: let us assume there is no free will in a libertarian sense and that hard incompatiblism is true.

On the one hand society can certainly tell a woman, "You ought not to do that or you will be punished!" Human behavior can be conditioned and reconditioned through rewards, punishments, promises of rewards, and threats of punishments.

But let us say that a man has committed murder already and that in the most fundamental, ultimate sense he is not morally responsible for the act because circumstances beyond his control gave rise to the murder.

We may say that he should not have committed the act, but in saying so we are actually saying that the universe should not operate the way that it does, that the impersonal laws of physics ought not to have manifested the way they did through a particular conglomeration of matter. We may as well be saying that lightning ought not to have struck that woman: we are imposing our preferences, our "should's" and "should not's" on the way matter behaves as described by impersonal physical laws.

Do you think that a lack of belief in free will in this sense undermines the notion that morality is objective, that our moral codes are somehow external from individual or societal preference?
 

Kilgore Trout

Misanthropic Humanist
Does a lack of belief in free will undercut a belief in objective morality, in objective "should's" and "should not's?"

My thoughts are as follows: let us assume there is no free will in a libertarian sense and that hard incompatiblism is true.

On the one hand society can certainly tell a woman, "You ought not to do that or you will be punished!" Human behavior can be conditioned and reconditioned through rewards, punishments, promises of rewards, and threats of punishments.

But let us say that a man has committed murder already and that in the most fundamental, ultimate sense he is not morally responsible for the act because circumstances beyond his control gave rise to the murder.

We may say that he should not have committed the act, but in saying so we are actually saying that the universe should not operate the way that it does, that the impersonal laws of physics ought not to have manifested the way they did through a particular conglomeration of matter. We may as well be saying that lightning ought not to have struck that woman: we are imposing our preferences, our "should's" and "should not's" on the way matter behaves as described by impersonal physical laws.

Do you think that a lack of belief in free will in this sense undermines the notion that morality is objective, that our moral codes are somehow external from individual or societal preference?

If there is no free will then we are unable to do anything about what we're going to say, or how we are going to punish anyone. Nor, can we make any meaningful, independent judgments about morality. A lack of free will would apply to everyone, in every way.
 

McBell

Unbound
Please explain how morality is so reliant upon free will.

I can think of a situation where murder is in fact the moral thing to do.
 

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
Please explain how morality is so reliant upon free will.

I can think of a situation where murder is in fact the moral thing to do.

If our behavior is most fundamentally an expression of impersonal physical laws, to say one ought not to have committed a given act is to say the laws of physics should not have manifested the way they did. It is like saying lightning was immoral for striking someone. We are assuming here that human behavior is as much an expression of impersonal physical laws as anything else.
 

McBell

Unbound
If our behavior is most fundamentally an expression of impersonal physical laws, to say one ought not to have committed a given act is to say the laws of physics should not have manifested the way they did. It is like saying lightning was immoral for striking someone. We are assuming here that human behavior is as much an expression of impersonal physical laws as anything else.
Perhaps we should start with you defining "free will".

Some people have some rather silly notions of what free will is and is not.
 

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
Perhaps we should start with you defining "free will".

Some people have some rather silly notions of what free will is and is not.

Free will is herein understood as the belief that I could have acted differently than I did in a given situation even if all causes and conditions in the universe remained identical.

I have assumed an incompatibilist stance for the purpose of this discussion.
 

Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
Free will is herein understood as the belief that I could have acted differently than I did in a given situation even if all causes and conditions in the universe remained identical.

I have assumed an incompatibilist stance for the purpose of this discussion.

I don't like this definition of free will. I know it is how some folks define it, but it defines it in such a way that makes it impossible for free will to exist.

Free will IMO doesn't pertain to what you could have done. It pertains to what you will do.

It's before you make a choice that you weigh the possible outcome of your actions and make a decision of the best course of action for to to take.

There no changing an action that's already been done. Saying free will only exists if you can change the past seems rather silly.

So in our future choices, we consider moral rules, consequences etc. This is the point where these things can affect our choices. This is why we create moral judgement, laws, punishments. To alter the choices we would otherwise make in the future.

The free will that is possible is the ability to evaluate all information that is available to us and act on that information according to our choice. There are times were you can't act as you choose to act. In such cases our free will is restricted.
 

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
I don't like this definition of free will. I know it is how some folks define it, but it defines it in such a way that makes it impossible for free will to exist.

Free will IMO doesn't pertain to what you could have done. It pertains to what you will do.

It's before you make a choice that you weigh the possible outcome of your actions and make a decision of the best course of action for to to take.

There no changing an action that's already been done. Saying free will only exists if you can change the past seems rather silly.

So in our future choices, we consider moral rules, consequences etc. This is the point where these things can affect our choices. This is why we create moral judgement, laws, punishments. To alter the choices we would otherwise make in the future.

The free will that is possible is the ability to evaluate all information that is available to us and act on that information according to our choice. There are times were you can't act as you choose to act. In such cases our free will is restricted.

I don't think anyone denies that there are choices in a conventional sense. What is affirmed is that those choices ultimately emerge from numerous causes and conditions as expressions of physical laws over which one has no control making moral responsibility illusory in the most fundamental sense. One may identify an organism as the location from which a behavior occurred and act accordingly, but the organism has no power over the causes and conditions that compelled an act.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Does a lack of belief in free will undercut a belief in objective morality, in objective "should's" and "should not's?"

Free will is herein understood as the belief . .
Free will (or volition or will) is not defined as a belief: the definition of free will

the definition of volition

the definition of will

noun
1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the powerof control the mind has over its own actions:
the freedom of the will.
2. power of choosing one's own actions:
to have a strong or a weak will.
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:
My hands are obedient to my will.

Free will (or volition or will) is defined as an ability, a faculty or power, not as a belief.

Obviously one can have a belief of having free will (or volition or will), or the belief that free will (or will or volition) is real, or, on the other hand, one can lack such beliefs or actively disbelieve that one has free will or that free will is real.

Obviously to lack free will (or volition or will, as defined above) means that one cannot choose to act in a moral way rather than an immoral way. To lack free will (or volition or will) means that the rapist was unable to choose to not commit the act of rape.

For humans to lack free will, it does not imply that there are not right or wrong acts--it just means that humans cannot choose to engage in moral acts rather than immoral ones.
 

McBell

Unbound
Free will is herein understood as the belief that I could have acted differently than I did in a given situation even if all causes and conditions in the universe remained identical.

I have assumed an incompatibilist stance for the purpose of this discussion.
I do not understand.
There are any number of "choices" that could be made in any given situation.
 

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
Free will (or volition or will) is not defined as a belief: the definition of free will

the definition of volition

the definition of will

noun
1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the powerof control the mind has over its own actions:
the freedom of the will.
2. power of choosing one's own actions:
to have a strong or a weak will.
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:
My hands are obedient to my will.

Free will (or volition or will) is defined as an ability, a faculty or power, not as a belief.

Obviously one can have a belief of having free will (or volition or will), or the belief that free will (or will or volition) is real, or, on the other hand, one can lack such beliefs or actively disbelieve that one has free will or that free will is real.

Obviously to lack free will (or volition or will, as defined above) means that one cannot choose to act in a moral way rather than an immoral way. To lack free will (or volition or will) means that the rapist was unable to choose to not commit the act of rape.

For humans to lack free will, it does not imply that there are not right or wrong acts--it just means that humans cannot choose to engage in moral acts rather than immoral ones.

If behavior is as much the product of physical forces as a lightning strike how is imposing moral judgments on it any more sensible than judging a lightning strike? Both are expressions of impersonal physical laws.
 

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
I do not understand.
There are any number of "choices" that could be made in any given situation.

I have assumed (and believe) for the purpose of this discussion that there are not. I have no control over the physical causes and conditions from which my behavior emerges. I do not choose my genes, my environment, nor the state of my brain which behaves according to physical laws.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
If behavior is as much the product of physical forces as a lightning strike how is imposing moral judgments on it any more sensible than judging a lightning strike?
Who is "imposing moral judgments" on any acts?

To lack free will does not mean that the entity does have beliefs about moral or immoral acts; it just means that one lacks the power or ability to choose between right or wrong acts. Right?
 

Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
I don't think anyone denies that there are choices in a conventional sense. What is affirmed is that those choices ultimately emerge from numerous causes and conditions as expressions of physical laws over which one has no control making moral responsibility illusory in the most fundamental sense. One may identify an organism as the location from which a behavior occurred and act accordingly, but the organism has no power over the causes and conditions that compelled an act.

Yes but I do. I get angry I can control my anger so that my anger doesn't affect my choice.

I get hungry, I can choose to control that urge so that urge to eat doesn't affect my choice.

There are numerous conditions I can choose to not allow to affect my choices. Other conditions I can allow to affect my choices. Or allow something completely external to me affect my choice. (like relying on some sign from the universe or letting someone tell your fortune even)

Seems to me we have lots of control. Maybe some folks are unable to or maybe they choose not to exercise that control.
 

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
And, by the way, @EverChanging, the belief in having free will vs. the belief in determinism makes a difference in people's behavior: Psychological and Behavioral Effects of Belief in Determinism vs. Belief in Free Will

In other words, one's beliefs have an effect on one's behavior, proving mental causation, which is the primary prerequisite for having free will.

Mental states can still be traced back to impersonal causes and conditions. Brain states are manifestations of physical laws.
 

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
Who is "imposing moral judgments" on any acts?

To lack free will does not mean that the entity does have beliefs about moral or immoral acts; it just means that one lacks the power or ability to choose between right or wrong acts. Right?

How is the way matter behaves in a particular configuration right or wrong when ultimately such acts are products of impersonal forces?
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Mental states can still be traced back to impersonal causes and conditions. Brain states are manifestations of physical laws.
Prove that the belief of having free will is a "manifestation of physical laws." Cite the physical laws.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Who is "imposing moral judgments" on any acts?

To lack free will does not mean that the entity does not have beliefs about moral or immoral acts; it just means that one lacks the power or ability to choose between right or wrong acts. Right?
How is the way matter behaves in a particular configuration right or wrong when ultimately such acts are products of impersonal forces?
Obviously I haven't claimed here that the meta-ethical thesis of moral realism is true. Nevertheless, the only relationship between having free will and moral realism is the fact that an entity can choose to commit moral or immoral acts only if that entity can act willfully, volitionally. For humans to have free will does not imply that moral realism is true or false, and for moral realism to be true or false does not imply that humans can act wilfully or volitionally.

(Please note I left out the word "not" in my quoted sentence, now corrected.)
 

EverChanging

Well-Known Member
Prove that the belief of having free will is a "manifestation of physical laws." Cite the physical laws.

Your behavior emerges from a brain that is itself governed by physical processes. What alternative do you propose? That behavior is magical and separate from the natural realm
 
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