EverChanging
Well-Known Member
Does a lack of belief in free will undercut a belief in objective morality, in objective "should's" and "should not's?"
My thoughts are as follows: let us assume there is no free will in a libertarian sense and that hard incompatiblism is true.
On the one hand society can certainly tell a woman, "You ought not to do that or you will be punished!" Human behavior can be conditioned and reconditioned through rewards, punishments, promises of rewards, and threats of punishments.
But let us say that a man has committed murder already and that in the most fundamental, ultimate sense he is not morally responsible for the act because circumstances beyond his control gave rise to the murder.
We may say that he should not have committed the act, but in saying so we are actually saying that the universe should not operate the way that it does, that the impersonal laws of physics ought not to have manifested the way they did through a particular conglomeration of matter. We may as well be saying that lightning ought not to have struck that woman: we are imposing our preferences, our "should's" and "should not's" on the way matter behaves as described by impersonal physical laws.
Do you think that a lack of belief in free will in this sense undermines the notion that morality is objective, that our moral codes are somehow external from individual or societal preference?
My thoughts are as follows: let us assume there is no free will in a libertarian sense and that hard incompatiblism is true.
On the one hand society can certainly tell a woman, "You ought not to do that or you will be punished!" Human behavior can be conditioned and reconditioned through rewards, punishments, promises of rewards, and threats of punishments.
But let us say that a man has committed murder already and that in the most fundamental, ultimate sense he is not morally responsible for the act because circumstances beyond his control gave rise to the murder.
We may say that he should not have committed the act, but in saying so we are actually saying that the universe should not operate the way that it does, that the impersonal laws of physics ought not to have manifested the way they did through a particular conglomeration of matter. We may as well be saying that lightning ought not to have struck that woman: we are imposing our preferences, our "should's" and "should not's" on the way matter behaves as described by impersonal physical laws.
Do you think that a lack of belief in free will in this sense undermines the notion that morality is objective, that our moral codes are somehow external from individual or societal preference?