Omniscience + Creator = No Free Will

[Wandered Off]

'Possible' for whom though? For a human it's impossible to know the future, but we're not omniscient. 'Possible' is a limitation, and omniscience is beyond limitations by definition.

Good point - although that argument could be turned right back around against your contention too so that omnipotence includes the ability to know the future without compromising free will.

 

[McBell]

If god existed and were an omniscient creator then I contend we have no free will. God would know the future course of any creation by its omniscience. Thus, in the act of creation god determined the future course of that creation. Because god created, and knew the future course of that creation from ‘before’ (doesn’t make much sense but you get the idea) it created, we cannot have free will.

Discuss.

Please define the terms for use in this discussion.

Free will – where choices made by beings are solely determined by the beings themselves. This may include the analysis of external information in making choices, but htta choice is still determined by the being itself.

Omniscience – having absolute knowledge.

Creator – the creator of the universe as we know it.

So why are you limiting the definition of omniscience in your OP?

 

[CarlinKnew]

Good point - although that argument could be turned right back around against your contention too so that omnipotence includes the ability to know the future without compromising free will.

True, when someone believes god can do anything, even the logically impossible, there's no sense arguing with them. Logic is irrelevant, they can just reply "magic!"

 

[Dunemeister]

Carlin, you haven't been truly dealing with what I and your other interlocutors are saying. You respond "Yes, but" each time we contradict you, but you don't take account of what we say. Please consider carefully what I'm saying this time. I fear I'm repeating myself, which may bore others on this thread, but it bears repeating because you haven't really come to terms with it.

First, let's take God out of the picture for a moment. Let's just deal with the little matter of truth. We'll see that the problem about free will doesn't involve God's omnisicience but rather the truth value of propositions about the future. Once again let's take the proposition

D: Dunemeister will have granola and yoghurt for breakfast at 8 A.M. tomorrow.

D is about the future. The question is, can such a proposition as D be true? Some say it cannot be true because it's about the future. For a proposition to be true, say these folks, it must be about regular truths, such as

E: Dunemeister eats granola and yoghurt for breakfast every day

or about one event in the past, such as

F: Dunemeister ate granola and yoghurt for breakfast yesterday.

The problem has to do with truth conditions. What would make these propositions true? E is true if and only if I eat granola and yoghurt for breakfast every day. Otherwise, it's false. F is true if and only if I ate granola and yoghurt for breakfast yesterday. Otherwise, it's false. The problem with D, say these people, is that the truth conditions haven't been met yet. They are "up for grabs" so to speak. Some go farther and say that it has no truth conditions. On such a view as this, there is no problem of free will. If propositions about the future cannot be true, their truth value obviously cannot affect our freedom.

But what if it's possible for D to be true? Well, what would make it true? What are its truth conditions? Since it's about the future, we'd have to say that D is true if and only if I will eat granola and yoghurt for breakfast tomorrow.

So let's assume, then, that D is in fact true. It's true that I'm going to eat granola and yoghurt for breakfast tomorrow. Am I no longer free? Some would say so because the truth of D means that I cannot do otherwise. That is, if D is true, I can't have Corn Flakes for breakfast, for instance, or no breakfast at all. And if I cannot do other than D, I'm not free.

That seems reasonable except upon further examination. Does the truth of D mean that I CAN'T have Corn Flakes? No, it only means that I WON'T have Corn Flakes. What makes D true? Isn't it my decision at 8 A.M. tomorrow morning? At 8 A.M. tomorrow morning, I'm going to decide to eat granola and yoghurt and not Corn Flakes. It'll be possible for me to eat Corn Flakes, but as it happens, I will choose otherwise. I will be free to choose Corn Flakes, but I won't. So the truth of D doesn't impede my freedom.

So much for the truth of D affecting my freedom. Now let's add a knower. Drake the Magnificent is a psychic who, when he uses certain techniques, always reliably predicts the actions of a particular person at a particular time. Let's say that we've asked Drake whether D is true, and he says yes. What does this mean? Well, it means that D is true, first of all. Has Drake's knowledge of D changed my situation at all? It's hard to see why. For Drake knows D is true simply because D is true. If the truth of D doesn't stand in the way of my freedom, Drake's knowledge of D doesn't.

Of course, regardless how reliable Drake's predictions are, we could chalk that up to just dumb luck. Drake, we might think, doesn't actually know anything. So let's put God back in the picture - a thoroughly reliable knower. God knows D is true. Again, how does God know D? Well, it's because I'm going to eat granola and yoghurt tomorrow at 8. Notice the dependency relationship. God knows D because D is true. D is true because I'm going to take actions that make D true. Therefore God's knowledge is dependent upon my actions, not vice versa. God's knowledge doesn't MAKE things happen or prevent alternative things from happening. God just happens to know what happens and is going to happen because things happen as they do. So once again, if the truth of D doesn't make me unfree, then niether does God's knowledge of D make me unfree.

I hope this clarifies the counterarguments, Carlin. Taking account particularly the stuff I've bolded, I'd like to hear your comments after you've had a chance to think about them.

 

[CarlinKnew]

D: Dunemeister will have granola and yoghurt for breakfast at 8 A.M. tomorrow.

D is about the future. The question is, can such a proposition as D be true? Some say it cannot be true because it's about the future.

It must be true if god can know it to be true, which he can if he's omniscient.

 

[RomCat]

Some here have alluded to the fact that because
God created us and knows the future our future
is predestined for us.
This is an error that is embraced by many.
Foreknowledge by God in no way prevents one from
acting freely. God made us free. God cannot act in
a manner that contradicts Himself.

 

[JMorris]

Carlin, you haven't been truly dealing with what I and your other interlocutors are saying. You respond "Yes, but" each time we contradict you, but you don't take account of what we say. Please consider carefully what I'm saying this time. I fear I'm repeating myself, which may bore others on this thread, but it bears repeating because you haven't really come to terms with it.

First, let's take God out of the picture for a moment. Let's just deal with the little matter of truth. We'll see that the problem about free will doesn't involve God's omnisicience but rather the truth value of propositions about the future. Once again let's take the proposition

D: Dunemeister will have granola and yoghurt for breakfast at 8 A.M. tomorrow.

D is about the future. The question is, can such a proposition as D be true? Some say it cannot be true because it's about the future. For a proposition to be true, say these folks, it must be about regular truths, such as

E: Dunemeister eats granola and yoghurt for breakfast every day

or about one event in the past, such as

F: Dunemeister ate granola and yoghurt for breakfast yesterday.

The problem has to do with truth conditions. What would make these propositions true? E is true if and only if I eat granola and yoghurt for breakfast every day. Otherwise, it's false. F is true if and only if I ate granola and yoghurt for breakfast yesterday. Otherwise, it's false. The problem with D, say these people, is that the truth conditions haven't been met yet. They are "up for grabs" so to speak. Some go farther and say that it has no truth conditions. On such a view as this, there is no problem of free will. If propositions about the future cannot be true, their truth value obviously cannot affect our freedom.

But what if it's possible for D to be true? Well, what would make it true? What are its truth conditions? Since it's about the future, we'd have to say that D is true if and only if I will eat granola and yoghurt for breakfast tomorrow.

So let's assume, then, that D is in fact true. It's true that I'm going to eat granola and yoghurt for breakfast tomorrow. Am I no longer free? Some would say so because the truth of D means that I cannot do otherwise. That is, if D is true, I can't have Corn Flakes for breakfast, for instance, or no breakfast at all. And if I cannot do other than D, I'm not free.

That seems reasonable except upon further examination. Does the truth of D mean that I CAN'T have Corn Flakes? No, it only means that I WON'T have Corn Flakes. What makes D true? Isn't it my decision at 8 A.M. tomorrow morning? At 8 A.M. tomorrow morning, I'm going to decide to eat granola and yoghurt and not Corn Flakes. It'll be possible for me to eat Corn Flakes, but as it happens, I will choose otherwise. I will be free to choose Corn Flakes, but I won't. So the truth of D doesn't impede my freedom.

So much for the truth of D affecting my freedom. Now let's add a knower. Drake the Magnificent is a psychic who, when he uses certain techniques, always reliably predicts the actions of a particular person at a particular time. Let's say that we've asked Drake whether D is true, and he says yes. What does this mean? Well, it means that D is true, first of all. Has Drake's knowledge of D changed my situation at all? It's hard to see why. For Drake knows D is true simply because D is true. If the truth of D doesn't stand in the way of my freedom, Drake's knowledge of D doesn't.

Of course, regardless how reliable Drake's predictions are, we could chalk that up to just dumb luck. Drake, we might think, doesn't actually know anything. So let's put God back in the picture - a thoroughly reliable knower. God knows D is true. Again, how does God know D? Well, it's because I'm going to eat granola and yoghurt tomorrow at 8. Notice the dependency relationship. God knows D because D is true. D is true because I'm going to take actions that make D true. Therefore God's knowledge is dependent upon my actions, not vice versa. God's knowledge doesn't MAKE things happen or prevent alternative things from happening. God just happens to know what happens and is going to happen because things happen as they do. So once again, if the truth of D doesn't make me unfree, then niether does God's knowledge of D make me unfree.

I hope this clarifies the counterarguments, Carlin. Taking account particularly the stuff I've bolded, I'd like to hear your comments after you've had a chance to think about them.

if it is known that you will eat granola and yogurt in the future, it can also be known that you will have that granola and yogurt physically inside you. physically part of you

if that can be known, then obviously you must eat the granola and yogurt to create that future self. whatever you may feel about that illusion of choice, there is really only 1 choice. the choice to create the future which must be created, because god knew it.

when you only have 1 possible future, you have no choice. because you cant by definition choose. free will includes choice, if there is only 1 possible choice, then theres no choice is there?

It must be true if god can know it to be true, which he can if he's omniscient.

plus he's infallible no less, so he certainly cant be wrong about what he knows.

 

[Wandered Off]

Foreknowledge by God in no way prevents one from
acting freely.

I do not contend that foreknowledge prevents freedom of will. Foreknowledge, if it exists, is an effect of a pre-existent future, not the cause.

If your future is known, you are incapable of acting contrary to your foreknown future. This is not compatible with free will.

The conditions for foreknowledge to exist - i.e., a pre-existent future - are what interferes with free will whether the actions are foreknown or not.

Your freedom of will is an illusion created by your perspective.

 

[logician]

Some here have alluded to the fact that because
God created us and knows the future our future
is predestined for us.
This is an error that is embraced by many.
Foreknowledge by God in no way prevents one from
acting freely. God made us free. God cannot act in
a manner that contradicts Himself.

Predestination certainly is impossible in a chaotic universe. One cannot predict wth certainty future events.

 

[Mister Emu]

As long as he creates you, and he has the foreknowledge, it doesn't matter whether or not he gained the knowledge "through" creating you.

You are the one who wrote:

By creating you in such a way that he knows what you'll do, he designed you like a human would design a robot to perform a specific task.

All I said was that He can know what you will do without programming(or otherwise controlling) ypu to do it...

That's beside the point. If the course of events in your future can be known, then it's impossible to stray from that known course.

And if that course is determined by you, then free will is not abridged...

 

[Wandered Off]

And if that course is determined by you, then free will is not abridged...

If your future existed before you determined it, then how can you be the one who determined it?

 

[Mister Emu]

If your future existed before you determined it, then how can you be the one who determined it?

If the future exists, then you exist in the future to be the one who has determined your actions...

 

[Wandered Off]

If the future exists, then you exist in the future to be the one who has determined your actions...

In that case, can it be foreknowledge?

 

[Mister Emu]

In that case, can it be foreknowledge?

From our perspective...

 

[Anti-thesisofreason]

If god existed and were an omniscient creator then I contend we have no free will. God would know the future course of any creation by its omniscience. Thus, in the act of creation god determined the future course of that creation. Because god created, and knew the future course of that creation from ‘before’ (doesn’t make much sense but you get the idea) it created, we cannot have free will.

Discuss.

Would god still be omniscient if he only knew all possible choices/outcomes instead of knowing for sure what choices we will make?

 

[JMorris]

Would god still be omniscient if he only knew all possible choices/outcomes instead of knowing for sure what choices we will make?

nope.

 

[Wandered Off]

From our perspective...

In that case, free will is an illusion created by the limitation on our perspective.

 

[Wandered Off]

Would god still be omniscient if he only knew all possible choices/outcomes instead of knowing for sure what choices we will make?

This is the compromise suggested in the OP here:
http://www.religiousforums.com/foru...would-foreknowledge-contradict-free-will.html

 

[Falvlun]

Yes, an omniscient creator would know all of that. He would know everything, he would have infinite knowledge. That includes the future, nonexistent 'things', everything. Everything means everything. That includes anything you can think of.

How can there be actual knowledge about things that do not exist? They have no properties. There is nothing to know about them. Omniscience is "all knowledge". You can't have knowledge about "things" for which there is nothing to know.

I believe this follows directly from the assumptions of creator and omniscience. That the universe would be deterministic to god is what my argument is based on.

The universe is either deterministic or it isn't. If it is, free-will is impossible.

And I don't see why it is impossible for God to create a non-deterministic universe. He fulfills function as Creator. And he would know everything there is to know about that universe, fullfilling the terms of omniscient. The future simply wouldn't be one of those things to know (since there is no thing about it that can be known).

I’m assuming that god’s omniscience as creator stretches to its creation, that god is omniscient with regard to the universe created.

Did God create the future? I'm not sure how your reply answers the contention that omniscience doesn't necessarily include knowledge of the future.

Which begs the response – in that scenario wouldn’t god simply be creating constantly with reference to us. Wouldn’t this be an even stronger case against free will if such creating were constant?

Creating what constantly? The universe? Why not--- maybe God's like a power generator and he needs to keep on running to keep all the lights on.

How is free-will curtailed by God creating? (Unless, of course, he were creating the future?) I have a feeling I missed your point and I'm curious...

 

[Dunemeister]

It must be true if god can know it to be true, which he can if he's omniscient.

This is all you can say? You lift a phrase out of context and make an irrelevant statement? I guess I shouldn't have bothered.