End result it saved lives, ours and theirs, at the cost of the two cities.
That nation, committed terrible terrible crimes against humanity. We did not.
Well...honestly...all nations involved in war committed 'terrible crimes against humanity' and I can pull up examples of prisoner murders, etc. That's really my point. No hands are lily white, and seeing ourselves as the 'good guys' is risky. We're just people.
To be clear, I'm not a pacifist. The Japanese (in this example) needed to be stopped, and military force was, in my opinion, for the greater good. But I think when we literally buy into a black hat/white hat mythology, it can have unfortunate effects on our decision making, where we subvert our own checks and balances because we're still 'comparatively good'.
I don't understand your point here.
I know they had not surrendered as of yet, and I know the second bombed quickened a decision.
I know both bombs were better to be dropped then carpet fire bombing the whole nation from head to toe, besides the US soldiers lives it saves.
You can know they hadn't surrendered, but I find it difficult to believe you can 'know' the second bomb hastened a decision, even if that were my point. It's a matter of conjecture. Besides which, 'hastening the decision' is completely beside the point if we're discussing this from a moral point of view. What is pertinent is the number of lives expended versus those saved. Even if I'm willing to put a massive premium on US military lives over Japanese civilian ones, there is no reason to believe a small pause before the surrender would be 'expensive' in terms of US lives. I see zero reason to believe Nagasaki was needed to avoid Operation Downfall being required.
Some pertinent points, although we might need a new thread if you really want to investigate this;
1) Japanese civilians outside of Hiroshima were almost universally unaware of what had happened in any detail. Further, in terms of deaths and damage, the a-bomb was less destructive than a wholesale firebombing campaign anyway, and the long terms effects were completely misunderstood even by the US. (there were plans to a-bomb landing sites during Downfall, then land within 24 hours, before resistance could be re-established).
2) The Japanese government was not entirely sure what had happened, or the implications either.
3) The Japanese government was provided less than 3 days to assess the impact of the first ever atomic bombing, and determine that unconditional surrender was their only option. Was a week unreasonable? What would it have cost? The US KNEW that the Japanese were trying to negotiate a surrender, so much of the Operation Downfall rhetoric is overstated in any case. The Japanese were talking to the Soviets about acting as mediators.
4) General Groves indicated that it was Dec 1944 that he came to the opinion that 2 atomic bombs could end the war. Prior to this his opinion had been that more would be required. That is not indicative of an operational decision, but a planned campaign (albeit of limited scope). It is worth noting that General Thomas Handy who signed off use of the 2 bombs, and that Roosevelt then changed sign-off protocols so he needed to be actively involved. This was perhaps partially because some generals were advocating a third strike, against Tokyo.
5) Key cabinet meetings between the 8-10 August spent MORE time focused on the Soviet entry into the war, which seemed to preclude any hope of a negotiated settlement (see Poland 1939-40 for an example of what happens when uncomfortable allies fight over the scraps) than it did on the a-bombs. The Soviet entry into the war, in my opinion, was effectively the second atomic bomb from a military standpoint.
6) The US indicated it would halt bombing on the 10th to await a response from Japan. This was, pragmatically, a sensible choice. They didn't HAVE a third bomb ready to go. Why could this action have not been taken after the first bomb?
7) US documents clearly indicate that the ability of the US to demonstrably produce more than one bomb was important for post-war discussions with the Soviets. There is a clear political rationale behind the second bomb, but it doesn't only include Japan.
8) Finally, as everyone knows, the second bomb was meant for Kokura. Nagasaki was originally fourth on a list of three potential targets, but got added when Kyoto was withdrawn for religious and cultural reasons, although it made more sense as a military target. What is perhaps less known is that the B-29 heading to Kokura couldn't bring the bomb back once it was launched. There were 2 choices. Drop it on Nagasaki, or drop it into the ocean.
There are credible historians who think the same way you do, so I'm not trying to represent my opinion as 'fact'. But there is enough there, in my opinion, to cast a lot of doubt over Nagasaki even if you are a person who accepts the necessity of Hiroshima. It's an example of what I'd see as black hat/white hat thinking. Just my opinion.