Where do rights come from?

[Audie]

So who was the fittest and strongest that ended slavery and allowed women the right to vote?

USA slavery? The union army and
500,000 dead wasn't might makes right?

 

[vulcanlogician]

I mean their basis is in one form of myth or another.

Religious myths or secular myths - narratives that explain why others should accept these values as true.

All men are created equal, his gave us 10 commandments, we have a duty to all of humanity etc.

I'm not denying that there are a such thing as secular myths. There are.

And yes, values are often communicated through narratives. Even much of science is commuted through narratives. Of course, physics is communicated via mathematics at a foundational level, but the way we learn a lot of physics, especially in high school, is communicated via a narrative. "Gravity is the curvature of space, etc." You could call these narratives inaccurate... ie. some kind of "stand-in" for the genuine mathematics. But what about biology?

Biology, (though some mathematics, chemistry, and physics are involved in its descriptions) is narrative-based even at the graduate level. It tells the "story" of evolution, or the "story" of how mitochondria provide energy to the cell.

Sometimes I think you are a bit too hard on narratives. Sometimes, when pure mathematics can't get the job done, we have to resort to narratives. Something being expressed in narratives doesn't necessarily make it mythology. How else are we going to communicate the facts of biology?

I think many of the things you've said concerning narratives are quite true and insightful. Don't get me wrong. Myths and narratives certainly do exist in almost all human conversations (secular or otherwise). But I do want to reply that some narratives are accurate, maybe even necessary. And not necessary in the sense that we "need" these narratives to lead better lives and not hurt each other. Necessary in the sense that they give us a more accurate picture of the world.

 

[MikeF]

The 13th amendment. Slavery is still allowed via an exception clause.

Just got around to looking this up. Thanks for the reference. I was unaware of the exception and the reasons behind it, nor what it continued to permit.

 

[Augustus]

Sometimes I think you are a bit too hard on narratives. Sometimes, when pure mathematics can't get the job done, we have to resort to narratives. Something being expressed in narratives doesn't necessarily make it mythology. How else are we going to communicate the facts of biology?

I think many of the things you've said concerning narratives are quite true and insightful. Don't get me wrong. Myths and narratives certainly do exist in almost all human conversations (secular or otherwise). But I do want to reply that some narratives are accurate, maybe even necessary. And not necessary in the sense that we "need" these narratives to lead better lives and not hurt each other. Necessary in the sense that they give us a more accurate picture of the world.

Myths are just stories that are not objectively true but explain how things are and/or should be. I'm not hard on them, I think they are the defining human characteristic and essential for cognition.

In this context, Rights are not a description of fact, but an expression of how things ought to be.

People don't think of rights in a purely transactional sense with a conscious acceptance that they don't really exist and we are just pretending they do out of self-interest.

Someone might explain that they hold to liberal humanistic rights, but understand they don't really exist and are just created out of convenience and self-interest, but they will get angry when someone violates these rights or feels their different values better suit their interests.

They genuinely do feel their values are superior, rather than being the result of differing socialisation and perceptions of self-interest.

They then construct narratives that explain to themselves why their values are better, which they perceive and experience as being true even though they are not. This is where a myth differs from a factual narrative.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Myths are just stories that are not objectively true but explain how things are and/or should be. I'm not hard on them, I think they are the defining human characteristic and essential for cognition.

In this context, Rights are not a description of fact, but an expression of how things ought to be.

Well said. But doesn't the fact that an "ought" is being expressed reintroduce the argument that rights are morality-based? Of course, there are other things that produce ought statements... cultural dogmas, (as you point out) self-interest, or personal convenience. But moral beliefs are one of the things that produce ought-statements, too. And I think that is where we get our standard Western, liberal interpretation of human rights.

You are right to point out that the idea of rights is communicated through mythologies of our "founding fathers"-- the unblemished idealists that they were-- in an attempt to create a "free nation" etc. etc. etc.

This telling of the origin of human rights is indeed a myth and is indeed mostly false. But so it is also false that people merely invented the concept of rights out of thin air in order to serve their mutual self-interests.

The idea of rights is rooted in social contract theory. Specifically, it is the brainchild of John Locke. (Hobbes never discussed anything close to the idea of "human rights" in his rendition of social contract theory. He thought that people lived in a perpetual state of war, and the only way to free mankind from that state of war, and establish civilization, is for them to be ruled by some kind of absolute authority. Obviously I'm cutting corners, but that's the gist of Hobbes.)

But from Locke, we get a social-contract-based analysis of value that begins with labor:

Let's say that you come to inhabit a small piece of land in the forest. While camping in the wild, you spend one summer cutting down trees and building a wooden cabin. The trees that you use to build the cabin belong to no one at first, but then, by enacting your labor upon them, you make these resources yours. ie. the cabin you build is your own.

Like, Hobbes, Locke also understood humans to live in a perpetual state of war. In natural human society, unchecked, brigands and such are prone to set out, stealing people's cabins and taking the property of others. But equally troublesome to Locke was the idea that a class of nobility claimed ownership of what did not belong to them. If you examine this fundamental problem closely, you'll see that it is a moral problem. In other words it's wrong (meaning morally wrong) for someone to come along and throw you out of a cabin that you built, simply because they can overpower you. So the foundation of Locke's theory was predicated upon basic moral axioms. Axioms of what is good or bad. Just or unjust.

From these basic axioms, Locke formulated a "fair and just" aka (moral) system of rights that would ensue. His three fundamental rights were "life, liberty, and property." (Sound familiar?) But he also argued for freedom of religion (sound familiar?)... except for atheists, for whom he proposed silencing and imposement of a criminal penalty. To some extent, he advanced the notion of free speech. He was studied a great deal by many of America's founders, most notably Jefferson, who was quite enamoured with Locke.

Locke didn't come up with the concept of human rights for his own self-interests. His thinking was viewed with disdain in his native Britain; he published most of his works in the Netherlands. By some accounts, he was at serious risk of having his head removed from his body by uttering such challenges to the nobility. He formulated the idea of human rights based on two concepts: the state of war (descriptive concept), and the intrinsic value of human labor (normative concept).

People don't think of rights in a purely transactional sense with a conscious acceptance that they don't really exist and we are just pretending they do out of self-interest.

Someone might explain that they hold to liberal humanistic rights, but understand they don't really exist and are just created out of convenience and self-interest, but they will get angry when someone violates these rights or feels their different values better suit their interests.

They genuinely do feel their values are superior, rather than being the result of differing socialisation and perceptions of self-interest.

That's something that irritates me about relativists. When they talk about morality in the abstract, it is nothing more than a bunch of dogmas and prejudices that folks accept wholly due to societal influence.

But when THEY THEMSELVES are outraged by some moral issue in the world, they immediately assume that they are working with a moral absolute. It's cognitive dissonance so far as I can tell. When they express moral outrage at something, they unfailingly omit the part where they think all moral positions (including their own) are reducible to prejudice and dogma alone.

I think it's pretty easy to demonstrate that an idea of human rights is separable from self interest. Take the issue of gay marriage. Marriage was a right granted by the state, that included a special status for two citizens who wished to be legally bound under the law. The right to participate in this institution was once only reserved for heterosexual couples. But, eventually, many people began to argue that gays ought to have the right to participate in this institution.

The fact is, though, plenty of straight people supported gays' right to get married. That has nothing to do with self-interest. If it did, it would have to be that straight people had something to gain from gay marriage. But no straight person gained anything by extending the right of marriage to gays. It was just (obviously) the right thing to do. That is completely divorced from self-interest. But, hmmmmm, it seems like if we are bringing in the term "it's the right thing to do" then we may be talking about moral considerations.

I think it's easier to make the case that rights are morality-based than "consensus-based" or "self-interest-based." But, based on what you said before, rights being based on morality is a misunderstanding of what's actually going on. I'd love to get a defense of that thesis if you're in the mood.

 

[MikeF]

The fact is, though, plenty of straight people supported gays' right to get married. That has nothing to do with self-interest. If it did, it would have to be that straight people had something to gain from gay marriage. But no straight person gained anything by extending the right of marriage to gays. It was just (obviously) the right thing to do. That is completely divorced from self-interest. But, hmmmmm, it seems like if we are bringing in the term "it's the right thing to do" then we may be talking about moral considerations.

Was gay marriage *always* just obviously the right thing to do? I would argue no, that it is only a recent phenomenon to have a majority in favor of gay marriage or consider it the right thing to do. Something changed. I'm not versed in human behavioral studies, but I would suggest that there are multiple underlying instinctual/emotional behaviors that can play a role in why we may consider something to be right or wrong and to whom those rights should extend. In addition to self-interest (no one wants the cabin they just built taken away from them}, there is empathy and also a fairness sense that enable us to expand self-interest rights to include those we consider to be within our *in* group as opposed to those who are considered other.

Given Western religious attitudes towards homosexuality, homosexual behavior put those individuals clearly in the *others* group, and as such, there was denial of rights and privileges beyond marriage. I would argue that it has really only been within the last 50 years that attitudes have begun to change, to soften, and only significantly so within the last 15-20 years. Now, with homosexuality no longer seen as a marker for being *other* by a large segment of society, empathy and fairness emotions can apply and extend self-interest rights to the homosexual community.

This would be my hypothesis, anyway.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Was gay marriage *always* just obviously the right thing to do?

Yes.

I would argue no, that it is only a recent phenomenon to have a majority in favor of gay marriage or consider it the right thing to do. Something changed. I'm not versed in human behavioral studies, but I would suggest that there are multiple underlying instinctual/emotional behaviors that can play a role in why we may consider something to be right or wrong and to whom those rights should extend. In addition to self-interest (no one wants the cabin they just built taken away from them}, there is empathy and also a fairness sense that enable us to expand self-interest rights to include those we consider to be within our *in* group as opposed to those who are considered other.

You are right in seeing that only recently people have come to see gay marriage in a more accurate way, morally. But that's not truth's fault. That's history's fault. Changes in attitude are morally neutral.

 

[MikeF]

Yes.

You are right in seeing that only recently people have come to see gay marriage in a more accurate way, morally. But that's not truth's fault. That's history's fault. Changes in attitude are morally neutral.

Interesting. Is the institution of marriage a moral construct, or is the moral question at play here one of fairness? Fairness in the sense that a privilege bestowed upon one or a few should morally be bestowed upon all.

 

[PureX]

Was gay marriage *always* just obviously the right thing to do? I would argue no, that it is only a recent phenomenon to have a majority in favor of gay marriage or consider it the right thing to do. Something changed. I'm not versed in human behavioral studies, but I would suggest that there are multiple underlying instinctual/emotional behaviors that can play a role in why we may consider something to be right or wrong and to whom those rights should extend. In addition to self-interest (no one wants the cabin they just built taken away from them}, there is empathy and also a fairness sense that enable us to expand self-interest rights to include those we consider to be within our *in* group as opposed to those who are considered other.

Given Western religious attitudes towards homosexuality, homosexual behavior put those individuals clearly in the *others* group, and as such, there was denial of rights and privileges beyond marriage. I would argue that it has really only been within the last 50 years that attitudes have begun to change, to soften, and only significantly so within the last 15-20 years. Now, with homosexuality no longer seen as a marker for being *other* by a large segment of society, empathy and fairness emotions can apply and extend self-interest rights to the homosexual community.

This would be my hypothesis, anyway.

I would assert that "what is right" depends on accurate information, logical reasoning, and benevolent intent.

The reason gay marriage was not always deemed "right" by peoples of the past is because they lacked accurate information, were not especially logical in their reasoning, nor, perhaps, were they entirely benevolent. As is still true of a significant number of people, today.

I think these are the factors that determine how and to whom we afford "rights". And if this is so, then I also think there is an ideal set of information, logical course of reasoning, and benevolent intent that would define our "rights" universally, even though we may at present not be fully aware of, or in possession of all these factors.

 

[MikeF]

I would assert that "what is right" depends on accurate information, logical reasoning, and benevolent intent.

A benevolent scientific approach then. I could probably get behind that. I suppose it would depend on what is meant by benevolent.

The reason gay marriage was not always deemed "right" by peoples of the past is because they lacked accurate information, were not especially logical in their reasoning, nor, perhaps, were they entirely benevolent. As is still true of a significant number of people, today.

This would be true for a great, great number of things.

I think these are the factors that determine how and to whom we afford "rights". And if this is so, then I also think there is an ideal set of information, logical course of reasoning, and benevolent intent that would define our "rights" universally, even though we may at present not be fully aware of, or in possession of all these factors.

Well you have lost me at *ideal*. Accurate information is independent of our subjective preferences. It is what it is whether we like it or not.

 

[PureX]

A benevolent scientific approach then. I could probably get behind that. I suppose it would depend on what is meant by benevolent.

Science has something to do with it in the sense that it can help provide needed accurate information, but otherwise it's not a scientific endeavor.

This would be true for a great, great number of things.

Yes, and it is. We need consensus to live together (and we can't live apart) whether we're right or wrong in that consensus.

Well you have lost me at *ideal*. Accurate information is independent of our subjective preferences. It is what it is whether we like it or not.

That is what is called an "idealized" view of accurate information. My point is that since we humans cannot comprehend absolutes except as idealized fantasies, we must consider and pursue them as such. "Ideally", rights would be determined by complete and completely accurate information, flawlessly logical reasoning, and perfect benevolence. But as humans we will never achieve these conditions. We wouldn't even know it if we did. So the best we can do is to strive, imperfectly, for them in the hope that getting closer is better.

Or not. But the alternatives keep proving to be very destructive to us.

 

[Eddi]

The State? God? Religion? Something else?

From successful political activism

 

[MikeF]

Science has something to do with it in the sense that it can help provide needed accurate information, but otherwise it's not a scientific endeavor.

Yes, and it is. We need consensus to live together (and we can't live apart) whether we're right or wrong in that consensus.

That is what is called an "idealized" view of accurate information. My point is that since we humans cannot comprehend absolutes except as idealized fantasies, we must consider and pursue them as such. "Ideally", rights would be determined by complete and completely accurate information, flawlessly logical reasoning, and perfect benevolence. But as humans we will never achieve these conditions. We wouldn't even know it if we did. So the best we can do is to strive, imperfectly, for them in the hope that getting closer is better.

Or not. But the alternatives keep proving to be very destructive to us.

What I would argue is that a universal ideal is literally impossible. The very mechanism of conception, development, and adaptive behavior of Homo sapiens guarantees no two are identical, and specifically in subjective preference in this context.

So we are left with consensus building, with politics if you will, as you indicate in your second paragraph.

 

[PureX]

What I would argue is that a universal ideal is literally impossible. The very mechanism of conception, development, and adaptive behavior of Homo sapiens guarantees no two are identical, and specifically in subjective preference in this context.

So we are left with consensus building, with politics if you will, as you indicate in your second paragraph.

To be specific, achieving a universal ideal is impossible, but the existence of a universal ideal is not, as we can imagine such a thing, even if we can't precisely articulate it.

We humans live in a mindscape of ideals, and an actuality of confused imperfection.

 

[MikeF]

To be specific, achieving a universal ideal is impossible, but the existence of a universal ideal is not, as we can imagine such a thing, even if we can't precisely articulate it.

I agree we can imagine universal ideals, but that set of ideals is unique to one's self. The issue is that the ideals themselves are in no way literally universal, hence the requirement for negotiation, compromise, and eventual consensus.

 

[PureX]

I agree we can imagine universal ideals, but that set of ideals is unique to one's self. The issue is that the ideals themselves are in no way literally universal, hence the requirement for negotiation, compromise, and eventual consensus.

Actually, they can be "literally universal", we just can't know them to be apart from us. It's like math. 2+2=4 is literally and universally true. Absolutely. But the actually that we humans live in doesn't allow for such absolutes. In our actuality, nothing literally or universally equals anything else. Actuality is not a collection of disembodies ideals, as math is. So the only way we can make these work together is to ignore the way that they don't work together. Two sheep plus two more sheep equal four sheep, so long as we ignore all the ways in which they do not. The idealization of addition is literally and universally true. But the world we live in doesn't allow that, so far as we know. So to make the ideal work, we have to be willing to accept imperfection.

 

[MikeF]

Actually, they can be "literally universal", we just can't know them to be apart from us. It's like math. 2+2=4 is literally and universally true. Absolutely. But the actually that we humans live in doesn't allow for such absolutes. In our actuality, nothing literally or universally equals anything else. Actuality is not a collection of disembodies ideals, as math is. So the only way we can make these work together is to ignore the way that they don't work together. Two sheep plus two more sheep equal four sheep, so long as we ignore all the ways in which they do not. The idealization of addition is literally and universally true. But the world we live in doesn't allow that, so far as we know. So to make the ideal work, we have to be willing to accept imperfection.

I get some of what you are saying, but the medical adage of "true, true, and unrelated" has come to mind while reading this.

We are talking past each other. You are saying sets of ideals exist but can't be reached, just strived for. I'm saying there is no agreement on the set of ideals and there never will. Ideals can't be reached because not everyone is aiming at the same targets.

What determines an imagined ideal other than subjective preference? Can you not imagine cases of conflicting preferences between individuals?

 

[PureX]

I get some of what you are saying, but the medical adage of "true, true, and unrelated" has come to mind while reading this.

We are talking past each other. You are saying sets of ideals exist but can't be reached, just strived for.

From our perspective. If I were to achieve objective perfection in some way, how would I even be able to tell? I wouldn't. Not objectively. Yet this does not mean that it can't happen. Only that I can't know it to have happened. So from our perspective, it is "unachievable". But that doesn't mean such a state doesn't exist, or is unachievable.

I'm saying there is no agreement on the set of ideals and there never will.

We don't need agreement to achieve them. We wouldn't know that we achieved them, anyway. But we still need to strive for them, because, what is our alternative? To accept defeat, and live like dumb animals? This is one of those very important questions facing humanity.

Ideals can't be reached because not everyone is aiming at the same targets.

We don't need agreement to achieve an ideal. Everything we humans have ever done involved lots of disagreement. What is crucial however, is that we keep trying.

What determines an imagined ideal other than subjective preference?

Information, reasoning, and benevolent intent.

Can you not imagine cases of conflicting preferences between individuals?

This isn't about "preferences". It's about information, reasoning, and benevolent intent.

 

[MikeF]

This isn't about "preferences". It's about information, reasoning, and benevolent intent.

Which is a subjective preference. Another may feel that setting aside benevolence is the only way to achieve some ideal.

The whole concept of an ideal is subjective, relative, and subject to change in an ever changing world.

I'm sure, however, that you quite disagree.

 

[PureX]

Which is a subjective preference. Another may feel that setting aside benevolence is the only way to achieve some ideal.

That's why we also need information and logical reasoning. Because feelings are not a very good method of choosing a course of action. Or especially, an ideal to act toward.

The whole concept of an ideal is subjective, relative, and subject to change in an ever changing world.

The whole point of establishing a conceptual ideal is to help us rise above that. It's why they are important to us. And it's why it's important that we pursue them even though we cannot achieve them fully, or certainly. And even when we may 'feel' otherwise.