Demanding an interlocutor read a (long, expensive) book, is probably the worst form of sealioning.
No problem Heyo. Don't read his book. But don't make conjecture about his philosophy. What you said about him was absolutely false. You earlier said no one with a logical mind will go in the compatibilist route. Well Dennett is one of the most respected Atheist philosophers in the world and he wrote and explained compatibalism. Not only he, but many philosophers have said that determinism and free-will compatible and that's called compatibilism. Even in the Atheistic hard deterministic model free-will is compatible, and Dennettt is a hard atheist. A militant atheist. So I first you just threw away that compatibilism is not logical, then you just made something up about Dennett, and now you just hand waved everything and resorted to some retort.
Anyway. Cheers.
The rest of your post is just rhetoric about fearing you which is just a pathetic statement to make, and I will leave you to it.
f our world is deterministic, then we function more like pseudo-random number generators than Geiger counter randomizers. In other words, if everything is predetermined, our life's "lottery tickets" were all drawn eons ago, sealed in envelopes, and distributed to us as needed throughout our lives. Some argue, "But that isn't fair! Some people will have been dealt more winners than others." While it's true that some individuals may receive better outcomes, luck tends to average out over time. "But if all the drawings take place before we are born, some people are destined to get more luck than others!"
The idea that the opportunities we perceive might only be illusory if determinism is true is not only metaphysically flawed but also politically and morally problematic. If real opportunities didn't exist, there would be no significant difference between someone deciding which prestigious university to attend and someone deciding whether to go to work in a factory. Pretending to question whether either individual has real opportunities is absurd—who wouldn't choose to trade places with the one considering Harvard, Stanford, or Swarthmore? We don't promote freedom by suggesting that the most important questions depend on the complex and uncertain implications of subatomic physics. The opportunities that matter to people are based on everyday aspects of their lives, and some people undeniably have more opportunities than others.
We can expect and should welcome challenges to the belief in free will, as we seek the truth. Incompatibilists, hard determinists, and other skeptics will undoubtedly develop new arguments to show that no one truly has free will, or that it would be impossible if they did. First, consider carefully which type of free will is supposedly threatened by the argument. Is this type of free will truly important? Reflect on whether you have any compelling reason to desire this type of freedom or to fear its absence. Would lacking this freedom really feel like being in prison or being a puppet? It might be that the argument only suggests we lack some metaphysical trait that is of little real significance. Worse, the desired freedom could be an incoherently conceived notion. Ask yourself: can you even imagine beings with freer wills than ours? What unfortunate aspects of our existence as physical beings do they avoid? If the ideal of freedom we aspire to is inherently contradictory, we shouldn't feel deprived when we learn we can't have it. There's no point in lamenting our inability to undo the past, prevent actual events, create ourselves from nothing, choose both options at a decision point, or be perfect.
This would still hold true even if we drew things on occasion during our lives. Even under a completely impartial and random system, it is unavoidable for certain people to receive more prizes than others. Even in a coin-toss competition that is fair, a winner will always be chosen. Even while the victor may not believe that their victory was their "destiny," winning still has benefits for them, and equality does not imply that everyone benefits equally.
In addition to being metaphysically problematic, the notion that opportunities we perceive may merely be illusory if determinism is real also raises ethical and political issues. There would be no discernible distinction between choosing to attend a great institution and choosing to work in a factory if there were no actual opportunities. It's ridiculous to act as though neither person has genuine opportunities—who wouldn't want to switch places with the person who is thinking about Swarthmore, Stanford, or Harvard? By implying that the most significant issues rely on the intricate and unknown consequences of subatomic physics, we do not advance freedom. People's opportunities are shaped by the daily experiences they have, and some people clearly have more opportunities than others.
As we search for the truth, we should expect and welcome challenges to the notion of free will. There will no certainly be additional arguments developed by incompatibilists, hard determinists, and other skeptics to demonstrate that no one genuinely possesses free will, or that it would be impossible if they did. First, carefully analyze which kind of free will the argument purports to threaten. Does this kind of free will really matter? Consider if there is a strong cause for you to dread losing this kind of independence or to want it. Would it really be like being a puppet or in prison to not have this freedom? Perhaps all the argument does is point out a small, insignificant metaphysical deficiency that we lack.
Even worse, the sought freedom could not even be a logical concept. Can you even conceive beings with more free will than we have? Which unpleasant aspects of our bodily existence do they steer clear of? If our desired level of freedom is intrinsically contradictory, we shouldn't sense deprivation when we discover we are unable to achieve it. We can't be perfect, stop actual events from happening, create ourselves from nothing, choose both possibilities when faced with a choice, or undo the past.
First premise: An action that is freely selected results from the agent's own goals, objectives, and drives.
For instance, Jane's decision to go for a run is influenced by her drive to exercise, her aim to keep healthy, and her willpower to see it through.
Second premise: An action is free if it is consistent with the agent's own goals, intents, and drives—even if these are influenced by past experiences.
Example: Although Jane's upbringing and prior experiences may have an impact on her desire to maintain her health, running is a free choice as long as it is something she chooses to do and isn't forced.
Premise 3: Determinism simply suggests that occurrences are created by earlier events in accordance with natural principles; it does not entail coercion or compulsion.
Example: Jane runs because she has decided to run, not because someone else makes her do so.
Premise 4: When an agent or outside force induces an action that goes against the agent's goals, intentions, or motivations, that action is referred to as coercion or compulsion.
An example of a non-free activity would be if Jane were to be physically forced to run against her choice.
Premise 5: An agent's acts are not forced or compelled if determinism is true and they are the product of their own goals, motivations, and desires—even if they are predetermined.
For instance, Jane's choice to flee was made freely because it was motivated by her own goals and was not coerced.
For this reason, determinism and free will are compatible.
Example: Free will can exist within a deterministic system, as demonstrated by Jane's freely decided action to run, which was driven by her internal motivations.
This argument demonstrates compatibilism's position that determinism and free will are not incompatible. If an action is motivated solely by the agent's own goals, intents, and desires and is not the result of external coercion or compulsion, it can still be free even when it is influenced by past events.
- P 1: If an action is freely chosen, it is caused by the agent's own desires, intentions, and motivations.
- Example: If Jane chooses to go for a run, her choice is caused by her desire to stay healthy, her intention to exercise, and her motivation to follow through.
- P 2: An action can be considered free if it aligns with the agent's own desires, intentions, and motivations, even if these are determined by prior events.
- Example: Jane’s desire to stay healthy might be influenced by her upbringing and past experiences, but as long as she runs because she wants to and not because she is coerced, her action is free.
- P 3: Determinism does not imply coercion or compulsion; it only implies that events are caused by preceding events according to natural laws.
- Example: Jane is not forced to run by an external agent; her running is a result of her own determined desires.
- P: Coercion or compulsion occurs when an external force or agent causes an action contrary to the agent's desires, intentions, and motivations.
- Example: If someone physically forces Jane to run against her will, this action is not free.
- P 5: If determinism is true, and if an agent’s actions are the result of their own desires, intentions, and motivations (even if these are determined), then their actions are not coerced or compelled.
- Example: Jane’s decision to run, arising from her determined desires, is free because it is not coerced.
- Q: Therefore, determinism is compatible with free will.
- Example: Jane’s freely chosen action to run, determined by her internal motivations, exemplifies that free will can exist in a deterministic framework.
This argument shows that compatibilism holds that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. An action can be determined by prior events and still be free if it is caused by the agent's own desires, intentions, and motivations, without coercion or compulsion from external forces.
So your claim that "no logical mind would think determinism is compatible with free-will". Now you say something about others fearing you.
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