To say "I believe X" tells you the truth about my belief in the truth of X.
Provided I believe you. Mostly, it tells me that you think X is true (other contexts of 'believe' notwithstanding).
It is a statement whose truth value depends upon my beliefs, not upon X. The truth of X doesn't depend upon my beliefs, but the truth of "I believe X" does.
Truth value and truth aren't equivalent. Let P be some proposition I don't believe in. There is all the difference in the world between asserting ~P, and "I believe ~P".
Agreed, for the most part. It is a statement whose truth value is determined, unconsciously by you, and it has informed your beliefs. Believing it doesn't make it true, but that's a statement for the objective observer; while you believe it, it has the appearance of truth. One of the better descriptions of "believing" that I heard painted it as "the attitude of truth." So, while you assert "~P," I, on my side of things, hear you say, "(I believe) ~P (is true)" and understand that ~P has the appearance of truth for you.
If someone asserts that Der Schnee ist weiß, and I assert that "snow is white", have we asserted different things? Can one be false and the other true?
The German phrase, if it's not understood, can have no truth value. It is neither believed nor disbelieved.
In general, it doesn't. Such determinations usually involve a complex set of cognitive processes and neurobiologically speaking involve not only regions from the PFC and frontal cortex but sensorimotor regions. This is certainly the case when it comes to determining beliefs.
Are you conscious of these cognitive processes?
You are equating beliefs with subjective assignments of truth values? First, many beliefs aren't simply aren't propositions. Second, beliefs are dynamic and not subject to a binary truth assignment (e.g., "I believe that's what happened", "I believe that's true", "I believe in you", "I believe that's possible", etc.). Third, what appears true to me changes as I consider options, choices, evidence, etc. In general, I choose what appears to be true by choosing how I feel (what I believe) about the nature of the evidence.
I recognize that there are other contexts for use of the word "believing," such as trusting, conjecture, and (yes) feeling. My interest is in the context of "the attitude of truth," such as declaring belief
in something, which is, I believe, the intent of this thread.
I am effectively equating the assignment of truth value with belief, yes. Truth values are assigned and reassigned as information about the world changes and grows, or is forgotten. I don't believe we have control over that information, or the process of assigning the truth value.
Who or what "gives it to" you?
Nothing does; nothing can. By that phrase, I meant that I don't allow that that be the case. The language of "choosing" doesn't fit that role for me.
Is there any mental state that you have that is not wholly determined, that you play more than a purely passive role in?
That's a leading question, and a discussion for another day.
Except that beliefs are internal, and predicated upon internal determinations of the external. They are "mental state" predicates for a reason: the predicate the external.
Beliefs are given to be internal; but ultimately, it's all information--neither internal or external.